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Appellant Gold’s Gym International, Inc. (“Gold’s”) challenges the district court’s 
denial of its motion for attorney fees, claiming that it is entitled to fees pursuant a 
contractual attorney fees provision.  However, this Court should affirm the district court’s 
ruling because Appellee Clark Chamberlain was not a party to the contract.  Furthermore, 
Gold’s argument on appeal, that Chamberlain is liable under the contract because he 
brought a derivative action, was never preserved in the district court.  In addition, Gold’s 
is estopped from arguing that Chamberlain’s conspiracy, conversion, and interference 
cause of action arise from the or relate to the contract when Gold’s successfully obtained 
dismissal of Chamberlain’s breach of contract claim by arguing the opposite – that the 
claims did not arise from or relate to the contract.  Gold’s also raises several arguments 
regarding the reasonableness and amount of its fees.  However, these issues are not 
properly before the Court because they were never ruled on by the district court. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Chamberlain was a member, along with Vince Engle, in Health Source of St. 
George, LLC (“HSSG”).  In 1999, HSSG entered into a license agreement (the “License 
Agreement”) with Gold’s.  The License Agreement contained an attorney fees provision 
granting attorney fees in any legal action arising under or relating to the License 
Agreement.  Chamberlain was not a party to the License Agreement.  Subsequently, in 
2001, Engle falsely represented to Gold’s that he was the only member of HSSG and 
requested that the License Agreement with HSSG be replaced with a franchise agreement 
with Fitcorp, Inc., a corporation solely owned by Engle.  Engle also converted all of 
HSSG’s remaining assets.  Chamberlain discovered Engle’s conversion of HSSG’s assets 
in 2003.   
In 2005, based on his belief that Gold’s had been aware of and consented to Engle’s 
wrongful conduct, Chamberlain filed a lawsuit against Gold’s (along with other 
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defendants) alleging cause of action for conversion, civil conspiracy and tortious 
interference (the “First Action”).  The First Action was subsequently dismissed without 
prejudice in 2008 for failure to prosecute.  Chamberlain then filed this case in 2009, less 
than a year later (the “Second Action”).  However, in the Second Action, Chamberlain 
alleged additional causes of action against Gold’s for breach of contract and negligence.  
Gold’s moved to dismiss the Second Action, arguing that it had been filed after the 
expiration of the applicable statutes of limitations.  Chamberlain opposed dismissal, 
arguing that the Second Action was timely under Utah’s savings statute. In response, 
Gold’s argued that the breach of contract and negligence claims alleged in the Second 
Action did not relate back to the First Action because they did not arise out of or relate to 
the same conduct transaction, or occurrence alleged in the First Action.  The district court 
ruled that the conversion, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference causes of action were 
timely because they had been raised in the First Action.  However, the district court agreed 
with Gold’s that the breach of contract and negligence causes of action had not arisen from 
and did not relate to the conduct, transaction, or occurrence alleged as part of the 
conversion, civil conspiracy, and interference claims in the First Action and dismissed 
those causes of action as barred by the statute of limitations.   
In the course of the district court proceedings, Gold’s filed several motions claiming 
that Chamberlain’s claims against it were derivative and should be dismissed because 
Chamberlain had not followed the procedures for bringing a derivative action. However, 
the district court ruled that Chamberlain’s claims were not, in fact, derivative.  Gold’s has 
not appealed these rulings. 
Ultimately, after a bench trial, the district court found in Gold’s favor and dismissed 
Chamberlain’s claims with prejudice.  Gold’s then filed a motion seeking its attorney fees 
as the prevailing party.  The basis for Gold’smotion was the attorney fees provision in the 
License Agreement.  Gold’s argued that, under this provision, it was entitled to its attorney 
fees because Chamberlain’s breach of contract, conversion, civil conspiracy, and 
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interference causes of action arose out of or related to the License Agreement.  When 
Chamberlain pointed out that he was not a party to the License Agreement, Gold’s argued 
for the first time, in its reply, that Chamberlain was bound by the terms of the License 
Agreement because he had sought to enforce its benefits.  Gold’s did not, however, argue 
that Chamberlain was liable because his claims were derivative.  The district court denied 
the motion for attorney fees, holding that Chamberlain was not a party to the License 
Agreement and that, with the exception of the breach of contract cause of action, the claims 
in the case had not arisen out of or related to the License Agreement.  
 
ISSUE ONE 
Whether the district court’s correctly denied Gold’s motion for attorney fees when 
Chamberlain was not a party to the License Agreement, Gold’s initial motion for attorney 
fees never explained why Chamberlain was liable under the License Agreement, Gold’s 
first argued that Chamberlain was liable despite not being a party to the License Agreement 
in its reply memorandum, Gold’s never argued to the district court that Chamberlain was 
liable because his claims were derivative, and Gold’s did not appeal the district court’s 
rulings that Chamberlain’s claims were not derivative.    
 
Standard of Review 
Whether attorney fees should be awarded is a legal issue that is reviewed for 
correctness.  See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
 
Preservation 
 “When a party fails to raise and argue an issue in the trial court, it has failed to 
preserve the issue, and an appellate court will not typically reach that issue absent a valid 
exception to preservation.”  State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15.  Gold’s Statement of the 
Issues fails to cite with specificity to the pages of the record on appeal where Gold’s 
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arguments were preserved.  See Appellant Br. at 7-8. 
 
ISSUE TWO 
Whether the district’s court correctly denied Gold’s motion for attorney fees when 
Gold’s had obtained dismissal of Chamberlain’s breach of contract cause of action by 
arguing that the breach of contract claim did not relate to or arise from the same conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence alleged in Chamberlain’s conversion, conspiracy, and 
interference causes of actions. 
 
Standard of Review 
Whether attorney fees should be awarded is a legal issue that is reviewed for 
correctness.  See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
 
Preservation 
 While this issue was not raised in the district court, “an appellate court may affirm 
the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on 
the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to 
be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory … 
was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court.”  




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 The complex factual background of this case is, for the most part, irrelevant 
to the issues on appeal.  Clark Chamberlain was a member, along with Vince Engle, in 
Health Source of St. George, LLC (“HSSG”).  See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (the “FFCL”) at Fact No. 17 (R. 3634).1  In 1999, HSSG entered into a license 
agreement (the “License Agreement”) with Gold’s Gym International, Inc. (“Gold’s”).  Id. 
at Fact No. 21 (R. 3635); License Agreement (R. 54-74).2  The License Agreement 
contained a provision granting attorney fees in any legal action arising under or relating 
the License Agreement.  See License Agreement at §O(4) (R. 68).  Chamberlain was not a 
party to the License Agreement.  See License Agreement at R. 54; FFCL at Fact No. 21 
(R. 3635).    
In 2001, Engle falsely represented to Gold’s that he was the only member of HSSG.  
See FFCL at Fact Nos. 44-46 (R. 3640-41).  In 2003, Engle had Gold’s replace the License 
Agreement with a franchise agreement with Fitcorp, Inc., a corporation solely owned by 
Engle.  Id. at Fact Nos. 48-50 (R. 3642).  Engle also converted all of HSSG’s other assets.  
Id. at Fact Nos. 51-53 (R. 3642-43).  Chamberlain discovered Engle’s conversion of 
HSSG’s assets in 2003.  Id. at Fact No. 57 (R. 3644)   
 
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On July 11, 2005, Chamberlain filed a complaint against Gold’s, among other 
parties, in Case No. 050912077 before the Third District Court (the “First Action).  See 
October 27, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order (R. 276).3  The complaint in the First 
                                                            
1 A copy of the FFCL is attached to the Appendix at Exhibit A. 
2 A copy of the License Agreement is attached to the Appendix at Exhibit B. 
3 A copy of the 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order is attached to the Appendix at 
Exhibit C. 
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Action alleged causes of action for conversion, conspiracy and interference against Gold’s.  
Id. (R. 277); (R. 261-62).4  The case was dismissed without prejudice on November 19, 
2008 for failure to prosecute.  Id. (R. 276). 
On November 18, 2009, Chamberlain filed his complaint in this case (the “Second 
Action”).  (R. 1-151).  The complaint in the Second Action alleged causes of action against 
Gold’s for civil conspiracy, conversion, breach of contract, negligence, and tortious 
interference. (R. 26-29, 35-38, 42-43).  On December 9, 2010, Gold’s filed a motion to 
dismiss Chamberlain’s conspiracy, breach of contract, negligence, and interference claims 
as, among other things, barred by the statute of limitations.  (R. 174-83).  In response, 
Chamberlain argued that his causes of action were timely under Utah’s savings statute 
because they had been filed within one year of dismissal of the First Action. (R. 184-92).   
In its reply, Gold’s conceded that Chamberlain’s “argument appears to be well taken 
with respect to those claims which were previously asserted in the [First Action.]” See 
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 218).5 However, Gold’s argued that 
Chamberlain’s “contract and negligence claims do not arise out of the conduct, 
transactions, or occurrences set forth or attempted to be set forth in the pleadings” in the 
First Action.  Id. (R. 220).  “There is no way that Gold’s Gym could divine from the prior 
asserted claims … that these Plaintiffs, who are not parties to the License Agreement, 
would assert a breach of contract claim.”  Id. (R. 218).  Similarly, Gold’s argued that the 
“negligence claim also appears to arise out of the License Agreement, or breach thereof … 
[t]here is no way that Gold’s Gym could have known that it would be subject to a 
negligence claim based upon the claims asserted in the” First Action.  Id. (R. 219).  Gold’s 
concluded that “[t]o the extent the claims arise out of or are related to the License 
Agreement, they are barred by the relevant statutes of limitation and the savings clause has 
                                                            
4 Chamberlain has not been to locate a copy of the complaint in the First Action in the 
record on appeal. 
5 A copy of the Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss is attached to the Appendix at 
Exhibit D. 
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no application … The savings clause extends only to claims which were asserted … in the 
prior action.”  Id. (R. 219).  And, at oral argument, Gold’s “contend[ed] that what they 
placed in [the complaint in the First Action] is not, does not arise out of the conduct, 
transaction, or current set forth in the – attempted to be set forth in the original pleading … 
[t]he issues arising out of breach of contract of the Franchise Agreement simply aren’t 
relevant to the types of claims that were asserted.”  (R. 4367). 
In its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the district court held that “[t]he claims for 
conspiracy and interference are properly raised now because they were also raised in 
Plaintiff’s previous lawsuit, and they met the statute of limitations at the time the 2005 suit 
was filed.”  See 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order (R. 277).  However, the district 
court went on to state that: 
 
The Court determines that the breach of contract and negligence claims are 
not substantially similar to the previous claims … The Plaintiffs claim they 
had put Gold’s Gym on notice because the earlier claims regarding the 
License Agreement between Health Source and Gold’s Gym, and the facts 
arose from the same dealings.  Gold’s counters that the 2005 Complaint 
had no claims asserted upon the transaction of entering into the License 
Agreement.  These two additional claims are not substantially similar to 
those in the previous suit. 
Id. (R. 278).  As a result, the district court dismissed the breach of contract and negligence 
claims.  Id. 
 On February 26, 2013, Gold’s filed a motion for summary judgment on 
Chamberlain’s remaining claims.  (R. 591-631).  As one of its basis for dismissal, Gold’s 
argued that, because Chamberlain was not a party to the License Agreement, Chamberlain 
had no standing to bring any claims on behalf of HSSG.  (R. 627).  Gold’s further argued 
that Chamberlain’s claims were all derivative and therefore had to be dismissed because 
Chamberlain had not satisfied the procedural requirements for bringing a derivative action.  
(R. 627-28).  On September 6, 2013, the district court issued a memorandum decision on 
Gold’s motion for summary judgment.  See September 2013 Memorandum Decision (R 
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1427-1449).6  In denying summary judgment, the district court concluded that “Plaintiffs 
Clark Chamberlain and Brent Statham are not improper parties, and Gold’s has not shown 
that this is a derivative action that would require [HSSG] to be named as a Plaintiff.”  Id. 
[R. 1440].  On October 1, 2013, Gold’s filed a motion for clarification, revision and 
reconsideration of the 2013 Memorandum Decision.  (R. 1502-1515).  As part of the 
Motion, Gold’s again argued that Chamberlain’s remaining claims should be dismissed as 
derivative.  (R. 1507-1509).  On April 1, 2014, the district court denied the motion for 
reconsideration.  (R. 1724). 
 Beginning on November 1, 2016, the district court held a three-day bench trial on 
Chamberlain’s claims.  (R. 3354, 3369-70, 3408).  At the conclusion of the trial, Gold’s 
filed a Motion for Directed Verdict.  (R. 3374-3394).  Yet again, Gold’s argued that 
Chamberlain lacked standing and his claims were derivative. (R. 3380-3381).  On 
December 19, 2016, the district court entered its FFLC ordering judgment in favor of 
Gold’s and dismissing all of Chamberlain’s claims with prejudice.  See FFCL (R. 3631-
3665).  In the FFCL, the district court reaffirmed its prior ruling that “Plaintiffs have 
standing to bring their claims and those claims are not derivative.” See FFCL (R. 3652). 
 On January 9, 2017, Gold’s filed its Motion for Attorney Fees.  See Motion for 
Attorney Fees (R. 3817-3869).7  In the Motion for Attorney Fees, Gold’s argued that, as 
the prevailing party, it was entitled to attorney fees under the License Agreement’s attorney 
fee provision.  Id. (R. 3818-21).  Not only did Gold’s argue that Chamberlain’s breach of 
contract claim was subject to the License Agreement’s attorney fee provision, it also argued 
that Chamberlain’s interference, conversion, and conspiracy claims arose from and related 
to the License Agreement.  Id. (R. 3822-3830).  Significantly, the Motion for Attorney Fees 
did not claim that Chamberlain was a party to the License Agreement and failed to argue 
                                                            
6 A copy of the September 2013 Memorandum Decision is attached to the Appendix at 
Exhibit E. 
7 A copy of the Motion for Attorney Fees is attached to the Appendix as Exhibit F. 
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why the License Agreement’s attorney fee provision applied to Chamberlain’s claims if 
Chamberlain was not a party.  Id. (R. 3817-3840).   
In his opposition to the Motion for Attorney Fees, Chamberlain argued, among other 
things, that Golds was not entitled to fees because Chamberlain had never been a party to 
the Agreement.  (R. 4055-57).  On March 24, 2017, Gold’s filed its Reply in support of the 
Motion for Attorney Fees.  See Reply in Support of Attorney Fees (R. 4321-4330).8  In the 
Reply, Gold’s did not argue that Chamberlain was liable under the License Agreement 
because his claims were derivative.  Id.  Nor did Gold’s argue any theory of liability 
predicated on the “closely-held” exception adopted by this Court in Aurora Credit Servs., 
Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280-81 (Utah 1998).  Id.  Instead, and for 
the first time, Gold’s argued that Chamberlain was liable under the License Agreement 
because he had allegedly “claimed the benefits of its protections” and was thus estopped 
from claiming that he was not bound by the provisions of the License Agreement.  (R. 
4322-4326).  Gold’s did not seek leave of the district court to raise this new argument in 
the reply memorandum.  
On March 29, 2017, without holding oral argument, the district court entered its 
Ruling and Order denying the Motion for Attorney Fees.  See March 2017 Ruling (R. 4340-
4341).9  The district court provided two reasons for the denial.  First, it held that 
Chamberlain was not a party to the License Agreement.  Id.  Second, it held that, with the 
exception of the breach of contract claim, none of Chamberlain’s claims arose out of or 
related to the License Agreement.  Id.  The district court did not address Gold’s newly 
raised argument that Chamberlain had claimed the benefits of the License Agreement and 
was therefore liable under it.  Id. 
                                                            
8 A copy of the Reply in Support of Attorney Fees is attached to the Appendix as Exhibit 
G. 
9 A copy of the March 2017 Ruling is attached to the Appendix at Exhibit H. 
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On April 4, 2017, Gold’s filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal.  See Cross-Appeal (R. 
4344-46).10  The Cross-Appeal stated that Gold’s was appealing from “the Judgment 
entered on 29 March 2017 … denying attorneys’ fees to Gold’s Gym.”  Id.  Similarly, in 
its conclusion section, Gold’s Appeal Brief only sought reversal of the district court’s 
“order denying Gold’s Gym the right to attorneys’ fees.”  See Appellant Br. at 38. 
 
C. DISPOSITION IN DISTRICT COURT 
Judgment in favor of Gold’s and dismissing all of Chamberlain’s claims with 
prejudice was entered on January 19, 2017.  (R. 3998-399).  Chamberlain filed a Notice of 
Appeal on February 21, 2017.  (R. 4038).  Chamberlain subsequently voluntarily withdrew 
his appeal.  Gold’s filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal on April 4, 2017.  (R. 4344-46). 
 
  
                                                            
10 A copy of the Cross-Appeal is attached to the Appendix as Exhibit I. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court’s denial of attorney fees should be sustained.  On appeal, Gold’s 
argues that, even though Chamberlain was not a party to the License Agreement, he is 
liable under its attorney fee provision because his claims were derivative.  Gold’s has also 
argued that, in addition to his breach of contract cause of action, Chamberlain’s conversion, 
conspiracy, and interference claims arose from or related to the License Agreement.  Both 
of these arguments must be rejected. 
First, Gold’s argument that Chamberlain is liable because his claims are derivative 
fails because Gold’s failed to preserve this argument in the district court and has failed to 
challenge the district court’s numerous rulings holding that Chamberlain’s claims were not 
derivative.  In its initial motion for attorney fees, Gold’s cited to the License Agreement as 
its sole basis for attorney fees.  Gold’s did not argue the reciprocal attorney fee statute, the 
derivative nature of the claims, or any other basis for imposing liability on Chamberlain.  
Gold’s provided an alternate basis of liability – that Chamberlain was liable because he 
had claimed the “benefits” of the License Agreement’s “protections” – for the first time in 
its reply memorandum, after Chamberlain pointed out that he was not a party to the License 
Agreement.  However, it was already too late to raise this argument.  Gold’s never asked 
for and never received leave to make a new argument in its reply memorandum and the 
district court never addressed the new argument in its March 2017 Ruling.  Most 
significantly, Gold’s never raised the argument it urges on appeal – that Chamberlain is 
liable under the License Agreement because his claims are derivative – in the district court.  
And, even if this argument had been preserved and could be considered on appeal, it would 
still fail because Gold’s has not challenged the district court’s previous rulings holding that 
Chamberlain’s claims were not derivative. 
Second, Golds is estopped from arguing that Chamberlain’s conversion, conspiracy, 
and interference claims arose from or related to the License Agreement.  At the inception 
of the Second Action, Gold’s argued that Utah’s savings statute did not apply to 
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Chamberlain’s breach of contract claim because the breach of contract claim did not “relate 
back” to Chamberlain’s claims in the First Action.  In fact, Gold’s expressly claimed that 
the Chamberlains’ causes of action in the First Action, which included the conversion, 
conspiracy, and interference claims, did not arise from and were not related to the License 
Agreement.  Based on Gold’s argument, the district court dismissed Chamberlain’s breach 
of contract claim with prejudice.  It would therefore be inequitable and unjust for Gold’s 
to now seek attorney fees by claiming the opposite – that the conversion, conspiracy, and 
interference claims arise from and relate to the License Agreement.  As a result, Gold’s is 
estopped from making such an argument. 
Finally, Gold’s has made numerous arguments regarding the amount and 
reasonableness of its fees.  However, these issues are not before the Court.  Because it ruled 
that Gold’s was not entitled to fees, the district court never addressed the amount and 
reasonableness of Gold’s fee request.  Therefore, in the unlikely event this Court holds that 




I. GOLD’S FAILED TO PRESERVE ITS ARGUMENT FOR WHY 
CHAMBERLAIN WAS SUBJECT TO THE ATTORNEY FEES PROVISION 
OF THE LICENSE AGREEMENT. 
The March 2017 Ruling must be affirmed because Gold’s did not preserve its 
arguments for why Chamberlain was liable under the License Agreement.  “When a party 
fails to raise and argue an issue in the trial court, it has failed to preserve the issue, and an 
appellate court will not typically reach that issue absent a valid exception to preservation.”  
State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15.  “An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been 
presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on it.”  
Id. (quotations, ellipses, and citations omitted).  “To provide the court with this 
opportunity, the issue must be specifically raised by the party asserting error, in a timely 
manner, and must be supported by evidence and relevant legal authority.”   Id. (quotations, 
ellipses, and citations omitted).   
 
A. GOLD’S DID NOT PRESERVE ANY ARGUMENT FOR WHY 
CHAMBERLAIN WAS LIABLE UNDER THE LICENSE AGREEMENT. 
Gold’s failed to preserve any argument for why Chamberlain was liable for attorney 
fees under the License Agreement.  In the Motion for Attorney Fees Gold’s sole basis for 
seeking fees was the attorney fee provision of the License Agreement.  See Motion for 
Attorney Fees at 2-4 (R. 3818-20).  However, Gold’s has conceded in its Appeal Brief that 
Chamberlain was not a party to the License Agreement.  See Appellant Br. at 11 (stating 
that “HSSF is a party to the License Agreement; [Chamberlain was] not in privity of 
contract with Gold’s Gym.”)  And, significantly, Gold’s initial Motion for Attorney Fees 
never explained why Chamberlain would be subject to the License Agreement’s attorney 
fee provision if he was not a party.  See Motion for Attorney Fees generally (R. 3817-
3869).  Gold’s did not argue the Chamberlain, a non-party to the License Agreement, was 
liable for fees under Utah’s reciprocal attorney fee provision or any other legal theory.  Id.  
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Instead, Gold’s first argument explaining why liability should be imposed, despite 
Chamberlain not being a party to the License Agreement, was raised in its Reply in Support 
of Attorney Fees.  See Reply in Support of Attorney Fees at 2-6 (R. 4322-4326).  However, 
because the argument was first raised in Gold’s reply, it was not preserved.  “Where a party 
first raises an issue in his reply memorandum, it is not properly before the trial court unless 
the party has received leave of the court to raise a new issue.”  Winegar v. Springville City, 
2014 UT App 9, ¶ 21, 319 P.3d 1 (quotations omitted).  Here, Gold’s did not seek leave of 
the district court to raise this new argument and the district court did not address it in its 
March 2017 Ruling.  See March 2017 Ruling (R. 4340-4341).  As a result, Gold’s failed to 
preserve its arguments and they may not be considered on appeal. 
 
B. THE ARGUMENT IN THE REPLY WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY 
LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
Alternatively, Gold’s argument for why Chamberlain was liable under the License 
Agreement was not preserved because Gold’s failed to support it with any legal authority. 
In its Reply in Support of Attorney Fees, Gold’s argued that “Plaintiffs asserted claims 
directly under the License Agreement and must bear the burden of attorneys’ fees because 
they claimed the benefits of its protections.”  See Reply in Support of Attorney Fees at 4 
(R. 4324).  However, Gold’s did not cite to any legal authority establishing that a non-party 
to a contract could be subject to liability under the contract simply by claiming “the benefits 
of its protections.”  Instead, the parties in the legal cases cited by Gold’s in its reply 
memorandum were also parties to the contract.  Id. at 4 n.9 (citing Richardson v. Rupper, 
2014 UT App 11, ¶ 11, 318 P.3d 128; Francisconi v. Hall, 2008 UT App 166; Prudential 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Hartford Acc. Indem. Co., 325 P.2d 899, 903 (Utah 1958).  As 
a result, Gold’s also failed to preserve the argument raised in the reply memorandum 
because it cited no relevant legal authority in support of its position.  
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C. GOLD’S ARGUMENT ON APPEAL WAS NOT RAISED IN THE REPLY 
IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
The argument that Gold’s set forth in the Reply in Support of Attorney Fees is not 
the same argument that it now makes on appeal.  In its Reply in Support of Attorney Fees, 
Gold’s argued that “Plaintiffs asserted claims directly under the License Agreement and 
must bear the burden of attorneys’ fees because they claimed the benefits of its protections” 
and Plaintiffs were equitably estopped from arguing that they were not bound by the 
attorney fee provision.  See Reply in Support of Attorney Fees at 4-5 (R. 4324-25).  
However, on appeal, Gold’s argues, for the first time, that Chamberlain is liable under the 
License Agreement because his claims were derivative.11 See Appellant Br. at 35-38.  As 
a result, Gold’s argument on appeal was not preserved in the district court. 
 
D. GOLD’S HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE DISTRICT COURT’S PRIOR 
RULINGS THAT CHAMBERLAIN’S CLAIMS WERE NOT 
DERIVATIVE. 
Gold’s argument on appeal that Chamberlain’s claims are derivative is barred by 
Gold’s failure to challenge the district court’s prior rulings on that issue.  Rulings of the 
district court that are not challenged on appeal will not be disturbed by the appellate court.  
See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 7, 194 P. 3d 903 (holding that “[i]f an appellant does not 
challenge a final order of the lower court on appeal, that decision will be placed beyond 
the reach of further review” and “[i]f an appellant fails to allege specific errors of the lower 
court, the appellate court will not seek out errors in the lower court's decision”); Velasquez 
v. Harman-Mont & Theda, 2014 UT App 6, ¶ 12 ,318 P.3d 1188 (affirming district court’s 
                                                            
11 In its Appeal Brief, Gold’s argues at length about the “closely-held corporation 
exception” to the procedural requirements for filing a derivative action adopted by this 
Court in Aurora, 970 P.2d at 1280-8.  See Appeal Br. at 31-35.  However, as Gold’s 
concedes in its briefing, “the holding in Aurora is narrow, subsequently distinguished, and 
inapplicable to the case at hand.”  Id. at 33 (emphasis added).  This is because Gold’s 
argues that Chamberlain’s claims should be considered derivative “regardless of whether 
they satisfy the Aurora closely-held exception or whether the Court desires to now depart 
from the Aurora decision.”  Id. at 32. 
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ruling when it has not been properly challenged on appeal); DeGrazio v. Legal Title Co., 
2006 UT App 183 (citing Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 818 (Utah 
1991), Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, ¶ 8 n.3, 983 P.2d 1103); Tracy v. 
University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340, 342 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1980) (holding that trial 
court rulings from which no appeal is taken become law of the case).  In this case, the 
district court ruled that Chamberlain’s claims were not derivative on at least two separate 
occasions.  See September 2013 Memorandum Decision (R 1427-1449); FFCL (R. 3652).  
And Gold’s has expressly limited its appeal to challenging the district court’s ruling on the 
Motion for Attorney Fees.  See Cross-Appeal (R. 4344-46); Appellant Br. at 38.  As a 
result, Gold’s has not challenged the district court’s ruling that Chamberlain’s claims were 
not derivative and its argument on appeal must necessarily fail. 
 
E. GOLD’S CANNOT REMEDY ITS LACK OF PRESERVATION OR ITS 
FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE DISTRICT COURT’S PRIOR 
RULINGS IN ITS REPLY BRIEF. 
Lastly, Gold’s cannot argue preservation or challenge the district court’s other 
rulings in its reply brief.  “When a party fails to raise and argue an issue on appeal, or raises 
it for the first time in a reply brief, that issue is waived and will typically not be addressed 
by the appellate court.”  State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15.  See also Coleman v. Stevens, 
2000 UT 98, ¶ 9, 17 P.3d 1122 (holding that “we will not consider matters raised for the 
first time in the reply brief”). As a result, Gold’s cannot raise any new arguments or 
challenge new rulings in its reply brief.  Furthermore, Gold’s bore the burden of 
establishing, in its opening brief, where each issue was preserved for appeal and, if an 
issue was not preserved, why it should be considered anyway. UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(B) 
(“Principal briefs must contain … citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved for review; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
preserved”).  Gold’s wholly failed to meet this burden.  Instead, Gold’s generally referred 
to its Motion for Attorney Fees, its Reply in Support of Attorney Fees, its 2013 motion and 
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reply memorandum in support of summary judgment, and the transcript of the three-day 
bench trial.  See Appellant Br. at 7-8.  These general references were not supported by 
citations to the record.  See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(e)(1).  Similarly, Gold’s was required to 
designate “the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from” in its notice of appeal 
and “summarize the party’s position and … state the specific relief sought on appeal” in its 
opening brief. See UTAH R. APP. P. 3(d), 24(a)(10).  But in its Notice of Cross-Appeal and 
Appeal Brief, Gold’s only claimed to be appealing the district court’s March 2017 Ruling.  
Therefore, because Gold’s failed to establish that its issues on appeal were preserved (or 
excepted from the preservation requirement), limited its appeal to the March 2017 Ruling, 
and only argued one (unpreserved) basis for liability in its opening brief, it is barred from 
making new arguments, claiming an exception to preservation, or extending its appeal to 
additional rulings in its reply. 
 
II. GOLD’S IS ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING THAT CHAMBERLAIN’S 
CONVERSION, INTERFERENCE, AND CONSPIRACY CLAIMS AROSE 
FROM OR WERE RELATED TO THE LICENSE AGREEMENT. 
Gold’s is estopped from claiming that Chamberlain’s conversion, interference, and 
conspiracy claims arouse from or were related to the License Agreement because, earlier 
in the proceedings in the district court, Gold’s successfully argued that Chamberlain’s 
breach of contract claim did not arise from and was not related to the same transaction or 
occurrence as the conversion, interference, and conspiracy claims.  “[A] person may not, 
to the prejudice of another person deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding 
between the same persons or their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such prior 
position was successfully maintained.”  Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 
132 P.2d 388, 390 (1942).  See also Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 
220 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that “[g]enerally in legal proceedings a party with 
knowledge of all the facts will not be allowed to take a position, pursue that position to 
fruition, and later, with no substantial change in circumstances, return to attack the validity 
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of the prior position or the outcome flowing from it” (citing 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and 
Waiver §§ 68-70 (1966)). 
Here, Gold’s successfully moved for dismissal of Chamberlain’s breach of contract 
and negligence causes of action by arguing that they did not arise or relate to Chamberlain’s 
conspiracy, conversion, and interference claims, which had been asserted in the First 
Action.  In its Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Gold’s expressly argued that 
Chamberlain’s “contract and negligence claims do not arise out of the conduct, 
transactions, or occurrences set forth or attempted to be set forth in the pleadings” in the 
First Action.  (R. 220).  “There is no way that Gold’s Gym could divine from the prior 
asserted claims … that these Plaintiffs, who are not parties to the License Agreement, 
would assert a breach of contract claim.”  Id. (R. 218).  Similarly, Gold’s argued that the 
“negligence claim also appears to arise out of the License Agreement, or breach thereof … 
[t]here is no way that Gold’s Gym could have known that it would be subject to a 
negligence claim based upon the claims asserted in the” First Action.  Id. (R. 219).  Gold’s 
concluded that “[t]o the extent the claims arise out of or are related to the License 
Agreement, they are barred by the relevant statutes of limitation and the savings clause 
has no application … The savings clause extends only to claims which were asserted … in 
the prior action.”  Id. (R. 219) (emphasis added).  And, during oral argument, Gold’s 
“contend[ed] that what they placed in [the complaint in the First Action] is not, does not 
arise out of the conduct, transaction, or current set forth in the – attempted to be set forth 
in the original pleasing … [t]he issues arising out of breach of contract of the Franchise 
Agreement simply aren’t relevant to the types of claims that were asserted.”  (R. 4367).  In 
summary, Gold’s argued that Chamberlain’s breach of contract and negligence claims did 
not relate back to the First Action and were therefore barred by the statute of limitations 
because the conversion, conspiracy, and interference claims, which were pled in the First 
Action, did not arise from or relate to the License Agreement.  Gold’s argument was 
successful.  The district court held that the breach of contract and negligence claims were 
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not substantially similar to the conversion, conspiracy, and interference claims because 
they did not arise from or relate to the License Agreement. See 2011 Memorandum 
Decision and Order (R. 278).  It therefore dismissed those claims with prejudice.  Id.   
However, in seeking its attorney fees, Gold’s argues just the opposite.  In its Motion 
for Attorney Fees, Gold’s claimed that the License Agreement’s attorney fee provision was 
applicable because Chamberlain’s conversion, conspiracy, and interference claims arose 
from or related to the License Agreement.  See Motion for Attorney Fees (R. 3822-3830).  
In denying the Motion for Attorney Fees, held that, with the exception of the breach of 
contract claim, none of Chamberlain’s claims arose out of or related to the License 
Agreement.  See March 2017 Ruling (R. 4340-4341). This was consistent with the district 
court’s ruling in 2011. 
While this Court has not previously addressed the circumstances presented by 
Gold’s appeal – where a party successfully prevails on a cause of action by asserting one 
position in the case and then seeks attorney fees by asserting the opposition position – the 
policy reasons favoring estoppel apply to Gold’s conduct here with equal force.  It would 
clearly be inequitable and unjust for Gold’s to prevail on Chamberlain’s breach of contract 
claim by arguing that his other claim’s did not arise out of or relate to the License 
Agreement, but then allow Gold’s to recover its attorney fees by arguing the exact opposite.  
As a result, this Court should hold that Gold’s is now estopped from arguing that the 
conversion, conspiracy, and interference claims arose from or are related to the License 
Agreement as a result of its previous conduct and, on this basis, affirm the district court’s 
March 2017 Ruling. 
 
III. GOLD’S ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE AMOUNT AND 
REASONABLENESS OF ITS FEES ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT. 
This Court should decline to address Gold’s arguments regarding the amount and 
reasonableness of its fees because they were never addressed by the district court.  
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“Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court and will 
not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.”  Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).  However, the district court never reached 
the amount or reasonableness of Gold’s claimed fees because it found no basis for awarding 
fees.  See March 2017 Ruling (R. 4340-4341).  Accordingly, if this Court reverses the 
decision of the district court, it should decline to reach these issues and instead remand so 
that the district court may make such a determination.  See e.g. Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. 
RB&G Engineering, Inc., 2010 UT 6, ¶ 25 n. 6, 230 P.3d 1000 (2010) (declining to consider 
issue not addressed by lower court). 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee Clark Chamberlain respectfully requests that 
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 THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
 SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
 
 
CLARK CHAMBERLAIN and BRENT 
STATHAM, 
 




VINCE ENGLE, an individual; HEALTH 
SOURCE, INC., a Utah corporation; 
FITCORP, INC., a Utah corporation; TRAVIS 
IZATT, an individual, d/b/a Gold’s Gym of St. 
George; FITNESS SOURCE, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; O.P.M. 
HOLDINGS, INC., a Utah corporation; 
GOLD’S GYM INTERNATIONAL, INC., a 
Texas corporation; ST. GEORGE FITNESS, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, d/b/a 
Gold’s Gym - Utah Group; and DOES I 
through X, 
 
                   Defendants. 
 
DEFENDANT GOLD’S GYM 
INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S MOTION 
FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 
 
Civil No. 090919785 
 
Judge Todd Shaughnessy 
Defendant, Gold’s Gym International, Inc. (“Gold’s Gym”), pursuant to Rules 7, 73, and 
54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully submits this Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 
and Costs, and in support hereof, states the following: 
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I. REQUESTED RELIEF AND GROUNDS THEREFOR 
On 19 December 2016, this Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
based on the evidence presented throughout a three-day bench trial, and awarded Gold’s Gym a 
complete defense verdict on all of the claims brought by Plaintiffs. Thus, Gold’s Gym is the 
“prevailing party” on all of Plaintiffs’ claims in this action. The parties’ License Agreement 
executed on 22 June 1999 contains a broadly-worded attorneys’ fees provision, which 
contractually entitles Gold’s Gym to an award of attorneys’ fees on all claims in this case. The 
Declaration from Gold’s Gym’s legal counsel, Mr. Blake T. Ostler, details the allocation of the 
attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in this action. Therefore, Gold’s Gym seeks an 
award from this Court of its reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in this case, 
as more fully described herein.            
II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
A. Gold’s Gym is Entitled to An Award of Attorneys’ Fees Under Utah Law and 
Pursuant to the Broadly-Worded Attorneys’ Fee Provision In the License Agreement. “As a 
general rule, attorney fees are recoverable only if authorized by contract or statute.”1 “If the legal 
right to attorney fees is established by contract, Utah law clearly requires the court to apply the 
contractual attorney fee provision and to do so strictly in accordance with the contract’s terms.”2 
“We first look to the writing alone to determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting 
parties.”3 In Giles v. Mineral Res. Int’l, Inc., 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 17, 338 P.3d 825, 829-30, the 
Utah Court of Appeals held that “[certain] attorney fees provisions at issue are not limited to 
                                                   
1 Giles v. Mineral Res. Int'l, Inc., 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 17, 338 P.3d 825, 829–30 (citing Hahnel v. Duchesne Land, 
LC, 2013 UT App 150, ¶ 16, 305 P.3d 208).  
2 Id. at 830. 
3 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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litigation arising from the contract claims.”4 “Rather, they are broadly worded and allow an 
award of such fees to the “prevailing party” in “any legal action aris[ing] under ... or relating 
to” the … agreement.”5 “Under this broad contractual language, attorney fee awards are not 
limited to the specific claims a party prevails upon but instead may be awarded to the party who 
prevails in an action that arises out of or relates to the agreements.”6  
In this case, as in Giles, the parties’ License Agreement contains broad contractual 
language relating to the award of attorneys’ fees, providing as follows: 
4.  Costs and Attorneys’ Fees: The prevailing party in any dispute relating 
to or arising out of this Agreement, shall be entitled to recover its costs and 
expenses including, without limitation, accounting’, attorneys’, arbitrators’, 
and related fees, costs, and other expenses, in addition to any other relief to 
which such party may be entitled.7 
 
This attorneys’ fee provision is broadly worded because it awards attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing party for “any dispute” that is “relating to or arising out of” the License Agreement. 
Thus, this clause does not limit fees to claims for breach of contract but instead awards 
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in any dispute or action arising out of or relating to the 
License Agreement. The parties’ attorneys’ fee clause in this action is vastly different from 
narrowly-crafted contractual provisions that only award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party 
who succeeds in “enforcing the agreement”,8 or to the “non-defaulting party.”9 Juxtaposing the 
various attorneys’ fee provisions makes it apparent that the parties bargained for an expansive 
and broadly-sweeping attorneys’ fee clause to be placed in the parties’ License Agreement. The 
                                                   
4 Id. (alteration in original).  
5 Id. at 830-831 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
6 Id. at 831 (emphasis added); cf. Energy Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Group Ltd., 2014 UT 13, ¶¶ 11, 45, 325 P.3d 
70 (holding that a breach of fiduciary duty claim fell within the scope of a contract's forum selection clause, which 
provided that “ ‘[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or related to the agreement shall be brought 
exclusively before the courts of England [and] Wales,’ ” because the clause's language did not “support a distinction 
between contract claims and tort claims” (alterations in original)). 
7 Exhibit 1, § 4, p.16 (emphasis added).  
8 B. Inv. LC v. Anderson, 2012 UT App 24, ¶ 33, 270 P.3d 548, 555 
9 Jones v. Riche, 2009 UT App 196, ¶ 3, 216 P.3d 357, 359. 
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contractual clause further includes granting “costs and expenses” even for “accounting’, 
attorneys’, arbitrators’, and related fees, costs, and other expenses….” Many contrasting fee 
provisions are not as broad or inclusive. It should also be noted this fee provision is also 
mandatory, i.e. “shall be entitled to recover its costs and expenses….”  
Therefore, the Court should grant Gold’s Gym an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the 
broad, mandatory contractual language contained in the parties’ License Agreement.   
B. Gold’s Gym Is the Prevailing Party On All of Plaintiffs’ Claims. “Generally, only 
the prevailing or successful party is entitled to an award of attorney fees.”10 “Determining the 
prevailing party is often an imprecise process.”11 “Our courts have developed a ‘flexible and 
reasoned approach’ for determining which party has emerged the ‘comparative winner.’”12 “It 
begins by identifying ‘the party in whose favor the ‘net’ judgment is entered.’”13 “The ‘net 
judgment rule’ will usually be ‘at least a good starting point,’ but it should not be ‘mechanically 
applied.’”14 “This approach requires not only consideration of the significance of the net 
judgment in the case, but also looking at the amounts actually sought and then balancing them 
proportionally with what was recovered.”15 “Consequently, ‘a party that makes an outrageous 
claim and then receives only a fraction of what it demanded’ – though the net judgment winner – 
‘will not likely be deemed the successful party.’”16 “Thus, we focus on ‘which party had attained 
a ‘comparative victory,’ considering what a total victory would have meant for each party and 
                                                   
10 Olsen v. Lund, 2010 UT App 353, ¶¶ 6-7, 246 P.3d 521, 522–23 (citations omitted).  
11 Id. at ¶ 7, 246 P.3d at 523. 
12 Id. (citations omitted). 
13 Id. (citations omitted). 
14 Id. (citations omitted). 
15 Id. (citations omitted). 
16 Id. at ¶ 12, 246 P.3d at 524 (citing J. Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d 353). 
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what a true draw would look like.’”17 “Comparative victory – not necessarily a shutout – is all 
that is required.”18  
In this case, all claims asserted by the Plaintiffs against Gold’s Gym were dismissed with 
prejudice. From the very outset of the case, Gold’s Gym successfully dismissed with prejudice 
Plaintiffs’ claims for: (1) breach of contract; and (2) negligence. Then, Gold’s Gym prevailed on 
each of Plaintiffs’ three (3) causes of action tried to the bench: (1) intentional interference; (2) 
conversion; and (3) conspiracy. Gold’s Gym provided a successful defense to all of Plaintiffs’ 
claims asserted against it.19 Gold’s Gym was found not liable on each of Plaintiffs’ claims 
asserted against Gold’s Gym despite the fact that Plaintiffs sought $7,165,032.21 in damages, 
$3,762,632.21 in prejudgment interest, and $20,000,000 in punitive damages, as stated in the 
proposed Default Judgments to be entered against the other Defendants.20 
Therefore, this Court should find that Gold’s Gym is the prevailing party on all of 
Plaintiffs’ claims asserted against Gold’s Gym.   
C. Gold’s Gym Is Entitled to Attorney’s Fees and Costs On Plaintiffs’ Breach of 
Contract Claim. On 26 October 2011, Judge Toomey granted Gold’s Gym’s Motion to Dismiss 
                                                   
17 Id. (citing J. Pochynok Co., 2005 UT 39, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d 353). 
18 Id. See Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 791 P.2d 217 at 222 (holding that defendants prevailed in context of 
plaintiffs' $600,000 claim notwithstanding a $7,339.44 judgment against them).  
19 Gold’s Gym reiterates what the Court stated in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: “To the extent any 
other claims against Gold’s Gym or St. George Fitness may technically remain in the case, Plaintiffs have waived 
those claims by not identifying them for the court at the time of trial. During trial, the court asked counsel to identify 
the claims for which Plaintiffs sought relief, and the court addresses those claims here. To the extent any claim or 
issue raised during trial by the parties is not explicitly addressed in these findings or conclusion, the claim or issue is 
rejected by the court and further discussion is unnecessary.” See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p.21. In 
addition, in the 6 September 2013 Memorandum Decision regarding Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Court ruled that “[t]he Complaint also contains a cause of action for injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs have not 
moved for an injunction since they filed the current action almost four years ago, and they are unlikely to do so, 
given the lengthy delay without one. If the claim for injunction were still viable, it would be subject to dismissal by 
laches. To the extent that the claim remains, it is dismissed.” See 6 September 2013 Memorandum Decision, p.12 
n.9. 
20 Exhibit 2, email dated 30 December 2016 from Plaintiffs’ counsel re: Proposed Default Judgments Against 
Defendants Vince Engle, Health Source, Inc., and Fitcorp, Inc.  
03821
Page 6 of 25 
 
with respect to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim.21 The Court concluded that the breach of 
contract claim was a new cause of action that “did not relate back to the earlier Complaint as 
provided by Rule 15(c), and the statute of limitations has run.”22 Plaintiffs’ contract claim arose 
out of and related to the License Agreement because the Plaintiffs alleged that Gold’s Gym 
breached that Agreement. Gold’s Gym was the “prevailing party” on Plaintiffs’ contract claim 
given Judge Toomey’s 26 October 2011 Order of dismissal of Plaintiffs’ contract claim.     
Plaintiffs filed this action on 18 November 2009.23 After analyzing Plaintiffs’ Complaint, 
Gold’s Gym determined to file a Motion to Dismiss on 9 December 2009.24 Gold’s Gym’s 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss and the Reply Memorandum in Support were 
concise and straightforward, consisting of approximately 10 pages of facts and legal analysis. In 
response thereto, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition and additionally a Surreply 
Memorandum, which contained roughly 15 pages total of counterarguments and other facts. 
Preparation and attendance was required for the respective hearing held before the Court on 31 
August 2011. In total, Gold’s Gym incurred $13,676.42 in attorneys’ fees and costs with respect 
to the Motion to Dismiss.25 Therefore, Gold’s Gym seeks the above-stated amount as part of its 
award for reasonable attorneys’ fees in prevailing in Plaintiffs’ contract claim. 
D.  Plaintiffs’ Intentional Interference, Conversion, and Conspiracy Claims “Arise 
Out Of” and “Relate To” the License Agreement. Plaintiffs’ intentional interference, 
conversion, and conspiracy claims each “arise out of” and “relate to” the License Agreement. 
Thus, Gold’s Gym is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees for being the prevailing 
party with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional interference, conversion, and conspiracy. 
                                                   
21 Docket, 26 October 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order, p.5.  
22 Id. 
23 Docket, Complaint.  
24 Id. 
25 See Declaration (“Decl.”) of Blake T. Ostler, ¶ 21.  
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1. Intentional Interference With Contract. With respect to Plaintiffs’ intentional 
interference with the License Agreement claim, this Court made the following statement in its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
Insofar as Plaintiffs are asserting that Gold’s Gym interfered with the License 
Agreement, or with a prospective Franchise Agreement, that claim fails because 
Gold’s Gym was (or would have been) a party to those contracts and Plaintiffs 
cannot sue Gold’s Gym for interfering with a contract to which it is a party.26  
 
This Court went on to further provide:  
Although Plaintiffs could potentially rely on their conversion claim as the 
improper means to support a claim against St. George Fitness (a claim that fails 
for the reasons identified above), they cannot show improper means by Gold’s 
Gym. At most, Gold’s Gym breached a contract with Plaintiffs (or the entity 
they now claim to control). A breach of contract cannot serve as improper 
means, unless, perhaps, there is proof that it was done intentionally and for the 
purpose of inflicting economic harm, which Plaintiffs have not shown in this 
case. “A deliberate breach of contract, even where employed to secure economic 
advantage, is not, by itself, an ‘improper means.’” Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co., 
657 P.2d at 309 overruled in part on other grounds by Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, 345 
P.3d 553; see also, Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 900 (Utah 1985) 
(“Without more, a breach of those implied or express duties can give rise only to a 
cause of action in contract, not one in tort.”); Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 
781 P.2d 414, 423 (Utah 1989) (same).27   
 
Based on the Court’s Findings and Conclusions, noted supra, a breach of the License 
Agreement was integral to the “improper means” element of Plaintiffs’ intentional interference 
claim. Plaintiffs’ intentional interference claim directly arose out of and related to the License 
Agreement because Plaintiffs relied on the argument that Gold’s Gym’s breach of contract 
constituted improper means for purposes of tortious interference. At trial, Plaintiffs’ counsel 
argued at length that Gold’s Gym’s knowing breach of contract constituted improper means for 
purposes of tortious interference. Mr. Nadesan argued that “[t]he improper means in terms of 
Gold’s [Gym] would be doing it contrary to their contract, contrary to any obligation to make 
                                                   
26 Docket, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p.29 (emphasis added).  
27 Id. at pp.30-31 (emphasis added). 
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sure they’re dealing with an authorized party.”28 This Court even specifically asked whether the 
improper means to support an intentional interference claim was “either conversion or breach of 
contract?”29 Plaintiffs’ counsel responded, “Correct.”30 The Court asked the parties to 
specifically brief whether breach of contract could constitute improper means to support tortious 
interference, which the parties then submitted respective post-trial memoranda on this issue.   
In addition, Gold’s Gym’s counsel at trail vehemently defended the breach of contract 
issue with respect to the improper means for an intentional interference claim.31 Particularly, the 
case was made that there was no evidence to establish that Gold’s Gym knowingly breached a 
contract with the intent to harm Plaintiffs. As a result, Gold’s Gym was forced to defend a breach 
of contract claim all the way through trial (even though the breach of contract claim was 
dismissed with prejudice on Gold’s Gym’s Motion to Dismiss) because an intentional breach of 
the License Agreement with the purpose to inflict economic harm can serve as a basis for 
“improper means” to support an intentional interference claim. However, Plaintiffs proved no 
such improper intent to breach the License Agreement. Thus, the tort claim of intentional 
interference was dismissed with prejudice.    
In Giles v. Mineral Res. Int’l, Inc., 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 18, 338 P.3d 825, 830, the Utah 
Court of Appeals analyzed a strikingly similar fee provision in a non-compete agreement, which 
provided: “If any legal action arises under this agreement or relating thereto, ... [t]he prevailing 
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney’s fees....” The Giles court then determined 
whether defendants’ tort counterclaim, i.e. breach of fiduciary duty, arose out of or related to the 
                                                   
28 Trial Transcript, 3 November 2016, 15:21-24 (emphasis added). 
29 Id. at 18:19-25 (emphasis added).  
30 Id. (emphasis added). 
31 Id. at 39-41. 
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non-compete agreement, and if so, to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party accordingly.32 
The trial court rejected the argument that the tort claim was unrelated or did not arise out of the 
contract claim, and thus, awarded attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party on the tort claim.33 
Affirming the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees, the appellate court in Giles first held 
that the fee provision, which is practically identical with the fee provision in the License 
Agreement, contains “broad contractual language” and that it is “not limited to the specific 
claims a party prevails upon but instead may be awarded to the party who prevails in an action 
that arises out of or relates to the agreements.”34 Because the same facts that supported the 
contract claim were incorporated for the tort claim, the court concluded that “the Contract Claim 
and the Fiduciary Duty Claim were filed together as a “legal action aris[ing] under” the 
agreements “or relating thereto” and that, as the prevailing party in the action, Giles was 
entitled to an award of attorney fees.”35  
As in Giles, the facts that support Plaintiffs’ contract claim are incorporated to their 
intentional interference claim, the respective legal theories overlap significantly, and the claims 
are intricately intertwined. In Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, ¶ 21, 993 
P.2d 222, 227, the Utah Court of Appeals similarly affirmed a trial court’s award of attorneys’ 
fees on the basis that the “contract and torts claims were based on related legal theories 
involving a common core of facts.”36 “Furthermore, when a plaintiff brings multiple claims 
                                                   
32 Giles, 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 19, 338 P.3d at 830. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at ¶ 21, 338 P.3d at 830-31 (emphasis added); cf. Energy Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Group Ltd., 2014 UT 13, 
¶¶ 11, 45, 325 P.3d 70 (holding that a breach of fiduciary duty claim fell within the scope of a contract's forum 
selection clause, which provided that “ ‘[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or related to the agreement 
shall be brought exclusively before the courts of England [and] Wales,’ ” because the clause's language did not 
“support a distinction between contract claims and tort claims” (alterations in original)). 
35 Giles, 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 22, 338 P.3d at 831 (emphasis added). 
36 See also Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219, 226 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (“Because these complex issues were so 
intertwined, we find the court acted within its discretion in its award of attorney fees”) (emphasis added);.Durant v. 
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 990 F.2d 560, 566 (10th Cir.1993) (stating because plaintiff's “claims arose out of a 
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involving a common core of facts and related legal theories, and [the defendant] prevails on at 
least some of its claims, [the defendant] is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees 
reasonably incurred in the litigation.”37   
Therefore, Gold’s Gym is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees because Gold’s Gym is 
the prevailing party with respect to Plaintiffs’ intentional interference claim that arises out of and 
relates to the License Agreement. 
2. Conversion of Contractual Franchise Rights. Plaintiffs’ conversion claim is 
inherently and directly “related to” and “arises from” the License Agreement. Throughout this 
entire case, Plaintiffs have asserted that Gold’s Gym converted their franchise rights under the 
License Agreement, and that Gold’s Gym converted the property and equipment located at the 
St. George gym that were allegedly Plaintiffs’ property pursuant to the License Agreement. As 
recently as 5 August 2015, Plaintiffs stated the following in their opposition memorandum to a 
summary judgment motion filed by Gold’s Gym:    
Gold’s clearly exercised control over the License Agreement and subsequently 
over the Franchise Agreement. Engle had to seek the permission of Gold’s to 
enter into a Franchise Agreement on behalf of Fitcorp, and Gold’s not only 
granted such permission … but it also unilaterally and on its own accord 
terminated the License Agreement and replaced it with Fitcorp’s Franchise 
Agreement. Gold’s also exercised control inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ rights when 
it not only consented to the transfer of the Franchise Agreement from Fitcorp to 
Fitness Source, but refused to relinquish its control and return the 
license/franchise rights to Plaintiffs when they notified Gold’s of their rightful 
ownership... Gold’s further exercised control over the franchise inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                                                                    
common core of facts and involved related legal theories, the district court may ... conclude her prevailing party 
status on ... [one] claim subsumes her failure to succeed [on the other.]”) (emphasis added); Caufield v. Cantele, 837 
So. 2d 371, 379 (Fla. 2002) (stating “the fraudulent misrepresentation complained of in this case could be correctly 
characterized as a tort stemming from or arising out of the failure of one party to carry out its contractual duty to 
reveal defects in the property. Had there been no contract, the ensuing misrepresentation would not have occurred. 
Therefore, the existence of the contract and the subsequent misrepresentation in this case are inextricably 
intertwined such that the tort complained of necessarily arose out of the underlying contract. As a result, the 
contractual provisions, including the prevailing party clause, should be given effect.”).  
37 Dejavue, Inc., 1999 UT App 355, ¶ 20, 993 P.2d at 227 (emphasis added); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 
424, 435 (1983). 
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Plaintiffs’ rights when it terminated Fitness Source, LLC’s Franchise Agreement 
… and, rather than returning the franchise to Plaintiffs, awarded the franchise 
rights to St. George Fitness, LLC….38  
 
Plaintiffs’ own arguments to the Court in effort to establish a conversion claim relate to 
and arise directly from the License Agreement. During closing arguments, Plaintiffs’ 
counsel argued that their conversion claim was dependent upon the License Agreement: 
“Instead what it did was it entered into an agreement where it replaced the old license 
agreement with a new franchise agreement. That is where the conversion happened .”39 
In addition, This Court made the following statement in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law:  
Also, the [franchise/license] rights ceased to exist when the License Agreement 
was changed to a Franchise Agreement. Lastly, even if these rights were 
somehow capable of being converted, their value at the time of the alleged 
conversion would be something less than the $8,500 HSSG paid for them when it 
entered the License Agreement.40   
 
Even during trial, the Court considered evidence concerning Plaintiffs’ assertion that Gold’s 
Gym converted their franchise rights granted to them under the License Agreement.   
 Significantly, the franchise rights they claim were converted and created by the 
License Agreement. In addition, Plaintiffs provide no additional evidence to support their 
conversion claim besides what is already presented to establish their tortious interference or 
breach of contract claim for that matter. Plaintiffs present a common core of facts and legal 
theories to support multiple causes of actions, including the claim for conversion, all of which 
arise from and relate to the License Agreement. 
                                                   
38 Docket, 5 August 2015, Plaintiffs’ Corrected Motion to Strike, or In the Alternative, Memorandum in Opposition 
to Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p.31-32 (emphasis added).  
39 Trial Transcript, 3 November 2016, 8:2-4 (emphasis added).  
40 Docket, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p.27 (emphasis added). 
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In Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, ¶ 22, 978 P.2d 470, 475, 
although a conversion claim was not at issue, the case entailed a “common factual basis with his 
breach of warranty and his negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims.” “Richards’s 
defense to Brown’s contract claim was that Brown had misrepresented the value of the company 
and had breached warranties under the contract and thus had failed to substantially perform.”41 
The court held that the “fees were recoverable” when the defendants’ attorneys’ efforts “went to 
prove facts common to both [claims].”42 
In this case, as in Brown, Plaintiffs’ tort claim for conversion is essentially a breach of 
contract claim. Plaintiffs’ assert that Gold’s Gym breached the License Agreement by not 
obtaining Plaintiffs’ written consent for an assignment of the franchise rights thereunder, which 
is the same basis for their conversion claim.  
Therefore, Gold’s Gym is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees because Gold’s Gym is 
the prevailing party with respect to Plaintiffs’ conversion claim that arises out of and relates to 
the License Agreement. 
3. Conspiracy to Convert or Intentionally Interfere With Contractual Franchise 
Rights. A conspiracy can only be proven based upon an underlying tort,43 and thus, it logically 
follows that Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim arises out of and relates to the License Agreement 
because Plaintiffs’ other tort claims do so as well. In fact, this Court held the following with 
respect to Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim as it relates to and arises out of the License Agreement: 
For there to be a meeting of the minds on an unlawful objective, Plaintiffs would 
have to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Gold’s Gym was aware of 
Engle’s plan to surreptitiously eliminate Plaintiffs’ ownership in the St. George 
gym through the device of converting the License Agreement to a Franchise 
Agreement, and in so doing change the franchise from HSSG, an entity in which 
                                                   
41 Brown, 1999 UT App 109, ¶ 22, 978 P.2d at 475. 
42 Id. (alteration in original). 
43 Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, p.13 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted).  
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Plaintiffs had a membership interest, to Fitcorp, an entity in which they do not 
have an interest…Showing that Gold’s Gym failed to follow its usual procedures, 
was careless in not investigating the matter further, or even that it breached the 
License Agreement by not verifying the accuracy of the statement – even if that 
were true, and the court does not find it is – would not be sufficient.44 
 
Here, the Court not only addresses conspiracy as it relates to the License Agreement but again 
states that Plaintiffs’ theory of conversion arises out of breach of the License Agreement. All of 
Plaintiffs’ claim arise out of and relate to the License Agreement.  
In Keith Jorgensen’s, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, ¶ 25, 26 P.3d 872, 
879, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed a conspiracy claim and an award of attorneys’ fees to 
the prevailing party pursuant to a fee provision that required reimbursement of fees and costs for 
“any action or proceeding against the other relating to the provisions of this Lease….” The court 
in Keith stated that “we conclude this lease language is broad….”45 On appeal, the plaintiff 
argued that “the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to Mall Defendants for successfully 
defending against his conspiracy to defraud claims because, as tort claims, they do not relate to 
the leases.”46 Upholding the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees, the Keith court held that: 
[T]he conspiracy to defraud and breach of lease claims significantly 
overlapped. Jorgensen’s Third Amended Complaint incorporated the same 
seventy-six background facts to support the breach of lease and conspiracy to 
defraud claims. The claims also relied on similar theories. Additionally, Mall 
Defendants used the same facts and discovery, depositions in particular, to 
defend against these claims. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err 
in awarding attorney fees to Mall Defendants for successfully defending against 
the conspiracy to defraud claims.47 
In the present matter, Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim arise out of and relate to their claims 
for breach of contract, tortious interference, and conversion. Each of Plaintiffs’ claims entails a 
common core of facts and legal theories arising out of alleged breach of the License Agreement 
                                                   
44 Docket, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp.23-24 (emphasis added). 
45 Keith Jorgensen's, Inc., 2001 UT App 128, ¶ 26, 26 P.3d at 879 (emphasis added).  
46 Id. at ¶ 27, 26 P.3d at 879 (emphasis added). 
47 Id. at ¶ 28, 26 P.3d at 879 (emphasis added). 
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and Gold’s Gym was compelled to assert the same facts and legal theories to defend against 
these claims.   
Therefore, Gold’s Gym is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees because Gold’s Gym is 
the prevailing party with respect to Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim that arises out of and relates to 
the License Agreement. 
E. The Time Spent Defending One Claim Was Spent Defending All Claims. Because 
the same set of common facts and related legal theories were alleged by Plaintiffs to establish 
each of their claims, the time spent by Gold’s Gym on defending one claim, such as intentional 
interference, was also spent on defending Plaintiffs’ conversion and conspiracy claims. It is 
nearly impossible to divide what time went to defending each of the claims because each of the 
claims were so closely related. Nevertheless, Gold’s Gym prevailed on each of Plaintiffs’ claims 
asserted against it, and thus, is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees.    
F. Gold’s Gym Prevailed On the Discovery-Related Motions. Gold’s Gym prevailed 
on the discovery-related motions because practically all of Plaintiffs’ respective motions were 
denied and Gold’s Gym’s respective motions were granted.48 First, on 14 February 2013, Judge 
Toomey denied both Plaintiffs’ Statement of Discovery Issues and Motion for Enlargement of 
Time because, among other things, Plaintiffs did not exhaust their standard discovery for a Tier 
III case.49 Subsequently, on 6 September 2013, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Court’s prior 14 February 2013 Order.50    
Next, on 19 June 2015, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ third attempt to extend fact 
discovery.51 In this 19 June 2015 Order, the Court also denied Plaintiffs’ request to compel 
                                                   
48 Gold’s did not prevail on one (1) discovery-related motion and has not included fees for that motion herein.  
49 Docket, 14 February 2013 Memorandum Decision, p.2. 
50 Docket, 6 September 2013 Memorandum Decision, pp.4-9. 
51 Docket, 19 June 2015 Order.  
03830
Page 15 of 25 
 
Gold’s Gym to provide any additional documents besides the re-constituted financial statements 
for 2006 and 2010, which Plaintiffs did not even use or present at trial because they were 
irrelevant – the ground upon which Gold’s Gym objected to the production of these documents 
in the first place.52 The Court denied Plaintiffs’ remaining discovery issues at that time.53 In 
addition, the Order from this Court on 20 July 2015 again denied Plaintiffs’ discovery motion to 
clarify the Court’s prior 19 June 2015 Order.54 
On 9 November 2015, the Court granted Gold’s Gym Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Expert 
Witness Designation as being grossly untimely since expert discovery had expired years 
earlier.55 Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Jury Trial, which the Court denied on 10 December 
2015 because it found that Plaintiffs had waived their right to a jury trial by failing to pay the 
requisite filing fee even after the Court reminded Plaintiffs of their failure to do so.56  
Due to Plaintiffs’ dilatory conduct throughout this entire action to properly prosecute its 
case-in-chief, Gold’s Gym was forced to respond to discovery motions that were filed even after 
the fact and expert discovery deadlines had expired by several years. Plaintiffs’ discovery 
motions were not even close calls due to the egregious failure of Plaintiffs to abide by the 
discovery deadlines or to exhaust the discovery guidelines before requesting judicial 
intervention. Gold’s Gym prevailed on practically all of the discovery motions during this action. 
The fees for which Gold’s Gym is seeking are the following discovery motions upon 
which Gold’s Gym prevailed: (1) 14 February 2013 – Plaintiffs’ Statement of Discovery Issues –
denied; (2) 14 February 2013 – Plaintiffs’ Motion for Enlargement of Time – denied; (3) 6 
September 2013 – Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration of the 14 February 2013 Order, for 
                                                   
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Docket, 20 July 2015 Order. 
55 Docket, 9 November 2015 Order. 
56 Docket, 10 December 2015 Minute Entry; see also 22 December 2016 Order. 
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Clarification, and for Enlargement of Time – denied; (4) 19 June 2015 – Plaintiffs’ Motion to 
Compel – largely denied; and (5) 20 July 2015 – Plaintiffs’ Objection to Form of  19 June 2015 
Order – denied. This amount further includes mediation efforts. 
In total, Gold’s Gym incurred $82,792.74 in attorneys’ fees and costs with respect to the 
identified discovery motions in this case, which includes analyzing Plaintiffs’ discovery motions 
and researching and drafting responses thereto, drafting Gold’s Gym’s discovery motion, and 
analyzing the documents and data disclosed therefrom.57 This figure also includes drafting 
discovery requests to Plaintiffs and writing responses to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, which all 
relate to and arise out of the License Agreement. Gold’s Gym has also calculated the time and 
expense incurred in phone conferences with opposing counsel to meet and confer concerning the 
discovery disputes and other consultations with clients. This amount also encompasses the time 
and expense to prepare for and attend the conferences held by the Court. This figure includes the 
time and expense incurred in drafting the respective discovery orders per the Court’s rulings and 
requests. Finally, this amount includes mediation efforts that occurred throughout discovery and 
prior to trial in this case.  
Therefore, Gold’s Gym seeks an Order from this Court in the above-stated amount as part 
of its award for reasonable attorneys’ fees for prevailing in the discovery related issues. 
G. Gold’s Gym is Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees for its Summary Judgment Motions. 
In Deer Crest Assocs. I, L.C. v. Deer Crest Resort Grp., No. 2:04-CV-220 TS, 2007 WL 
3143691, at *2 (D. Utah Oct. 24, 2007) (emphasis added), the Utah federal court held the 
following when awarding $279,726.00 of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party:  
Plaintiff's unsuccessful motion was related to the claims on which it eventually 
prevailed. Particularly in the context of a failed motion for summary judgment, 
in which fact development is critical, a subsequent success is possible after 
                                                   
57 Decl. of Blake T. Ostler, ¶ 23.  
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material issues of fact are resolved. Plaintiff ultimately achieved the goals of 
this lawsuit and, therefore, attorneys' fees for the partial summary judgment 
motion are appropriately included in the total fee.  
 
In this case, as in Deer Crest, Gold’s Gym’s motions for summary judgment were 
essential to prepare for trial and resolve outstanding issues related to Plaintiffs’ claims. Although 
Gold’s Gym did not prevail on all of its summary judgment motions the work done to prepare for 
summary judgment would have had to be done to prepare for trial and thus saved additional fees 
that otherwise would have been incurred in preparing for trial. For example, at trial Gold’s Gym 
relied on the previously filed motions to demonstrate Plaintiffs’ lack of disclosure of a damages 
calculation as required by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in addition to the lack of 
evidence to support Plaintiffs’ damages for lost profits, as was the case in Stevens-Henager Coll. 
v. Eagle Gate Coll., Provo Coll., Jana Miller, 2011 UT App 37, ¶ 35, 248 P.3d 1025, 1035, and 
in Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain W. Title, 2016 UT App 62, ¶ 17, 370 P.3d 963, 968, both of 
which were cited in this Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.58  
Similarly, Gold’s Gym argued at the summary judgment stage that it was entitled to 
judgment because it had no intent to conspire with Defendant Engle to deprive Plaintiffs of 
anything, nor could this be proven with clear and convincing evidence, with which this Court 
ultimately held after hearing all of the trial evidence.59 Gold’s Gym also argued at summary 
judgment that it was never in control or possession of the franchise property. The Court agreed 
with Gold’s Gym again on this point.60 Gold’s Gym previously argued that a mere approval of an 
assignment or transfer of a franchise cannot constitute conversion, and the Court found that such 
action does not amount to exercising control over membership contracts owned by the 
                                                   
58 Docket, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp.31-32.   
59 Id. at pp.23-24.  
60 Id. at pp.26-27.  
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franchisee.61 In addition, Gold’s Gym argued that Plaintiffs’ intentional interference claim fails 
as a matter of law because Gold’s Gym cannot interfere with its own License Agreement, that 
Gold’s Gym did not have the requisite intent to interfere with Plaintiffs, and nor did Gold’s Gym 
intentionally breach the contract, which would support the improper means prong of an 
intentional interference claim. All of these same arguments would have had to be briefed and 
prepared and the same costs required to prepare for summary judgment would have been uncured 
preparing for trial in this matter regarding the arguments that this Court relied on for its rulings.62     
Gold’s Gym’s summary judgment motions were advantageous because it produced 
important evidence, tested the parties’ theories, and revealed facts and issues that were 
previously unnoticed. Further, this Court’s 6 September 2013 findings set forth strong 
connections between Gold’s Gym’s motions for summary judgment and Gold’s Gym’s ultimate 
success in this case. For example, the Court noted that “Plaintiffs should have designated an 
expert within the specified discovery deadlines, and the Plaintiffs have been dilatory in providing 
even a ballpark figure for its damages estimate.”63 Finally, after all of the evidence was presented 
at trial, this Court accepted Gold’s Gym’s arguments that were raised in its summary judgment 
motions and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims altogether. 
In total, Gold’s Gym incurred $146,857.76 in attorneys’ fees and costs with respect to the 
summary judgment motions in this case.64 This amount includes time and expenses for drafting 
the motions, analyzing Plaintiffs’ responses thereto, preparing the reply memoranda in support 
thereof, conferring with clients, arguing the motions before the Court, and submitting the 
respective orders per the Court’s ruling and request. 
                                                   
61 Id. at p.28. 
62 Id. at p.29-30. 
63 Docket, 6 September 2013 Memorandum Decision, p.17.  
64 Decl. of Blake T. Ostler, ¶ 25.  
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H. Gold’s Gym is Entitled to an Award of Attorneys’ For All Claims Successfully 
Defended At Trial, Including Pre-Trial and Post-Trial Motions. “Where a contract provides 
the right to attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or 
defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to those claims on which the party was 
successful.”65 Because Gold’s Gym successfully defended each and every claim Plaintiffs 
brought against it, Gold’s Gym is entitled to recover the attorneys’ fees attributable to the claims 
that were tried to the bench and upon which Gold’s Gym prevailed, including pre-trial and post-
trial motions.   
In total, Gold’s Gym incurred $123,993.61 in attorneys’ fees and costs with respect to 
trial.66 This amount includes time and expenses for pre-trial motions, pre-trial disclosures and 
respective objections thereto, preparing the exhibits and witnesses, analyzing case strategy and 
Utah law relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, and spending three (3) days in trial before this Court. This 
amount includes the legal work involved with Plaintiffs’ pre-trial motions dated 9 November 
2015 – Gold’s Gym’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness Designation, which was 
granted in favor of Gold’s Gym; and 22 December 2015 – Plaintiffs’ Motion For Jury Trial, 
which was denied in favor of Gold’s Gym. This amount also includes the time spent preparing 
the Court-requested post-trial brief relating to intentional breach of contract as a basis to support 
the improper means element of a tortious interference claim, which was filed by both parties on 
14 December 2016. This figure also includes legal expenses concerning Plaintiffs’ post-trial 
motions dated 19 December 2016 – Plaintiffs’ Motion to Re-Open Evidence and Motion for 
                                                   
65 Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct.App.1990). 
66 Decl. of Blake T. Ostler, ¶ 27.  
03835
Page 20 of 25 
 
Sanctions, both of which were summarily denied as moot upon the Court’s entry of its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in favor of Gold’s Gym.67 
Therefore, Gold’s Gym is entitled to the above-stated amount as part of its award for 
reasonable attorneys’ fees for prevailing in the pre- and post-trial motions and at trial. 
I. Gold’s Gym is Entitled to an Award for the Time Spent Preparing the Motion 
for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. In Utah, “[a]ttorneys’ fees are generally awarded for the 
reasonable time spent preparing the subject motion seeking such fees.”68 In this case, Gold’s 
Gym has spent a total of $13,721.50 preparing this Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs as of 6 
January 2017.69 Additional time will be spent analyzing Plaintiffs’ response hereto, if any, 
drafting a reply memorandum, as needed, and preparing and attending oral arguments should the 
Court so require. Therefore, Gold’s Gym requests this Court to permit Gold’s Gym to 
supplement its request for attorneys’ fees for the time spent preparing and arguing this Motion 
before this Court.    
J. Gold’s Gym’s Fee Allocation is Reasonable. The Supreme Court of the United 
States has stated the following: “Where a [defendant] has obtained excellent results, his attorney 
should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably 
expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award 
may be justified.”70 “[T]he most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.”71  
                                                   
67 Docket, 19 December 2016 Minute Entry.  
68 Parker v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1237 (D. Utah 2013), aff'd, 572 F. App'x 602 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(citations omitted); see also Tinch v. City of Dayton, 199 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (awarding 
attorneys’ fees “to compensate them for the time incurred to request such fees.”); Barnes v. Astrue, No. 
3:11CV01780 HBF, 2013 WL 1296498, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2013), aff'd sub nom. Barnes v. Colvin, No. 3:11-
CV-1780 JCH, 2013 WL 3853446 (D. Conn. July 23, 2013) (same); Jadwin v. Cty. of Kern, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 
1140 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (same); Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1140–41 (E.D. Mo. 
1998) (same); Faust v. Menard, Inc., No. 2:11 CV 425 JM, 2014 WL 1259963, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2014) 
(same). 
69 Decl. of Blake T. Ostler, ¶ 29. 
70 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983).  
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In Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, ¶ 16, 978 P.2d 470, 474, the 
Utah Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s capricious reduction of the requested fee amount 
of $540,000 to $218,986.42. The Brown court stated that “the court erroneously eliminated fees 
where the factual development, although necessary to defeat Brown’s contract claim, also bore 
on Richards’s fraud claims.”72 The trial court also arbitrarily made a “thirty-five percent” 
reduction “of the total time expended through trial [i.e., the approximate time spent on the breach 
of warranty claim]...would be more reasonable.”73 The trial court was reversed because 
“Richards’s defense under the Asset Sale Agreement (i.e., Richards’s defense that Brown failed 
to substantially perform) had a common factual basis with his breach of warranty and his 
negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. Where Richards’s attorneys’ efforts went to 
prove facts common to both recoverable contract and non-recoverable fraud claims, the fees 
were recoverable.”74 “There was an overlapping of the warranty evidence and fraud evidence 
such that one could not allocate the time expended to one claim or the other with any degree of 
precision.”75 In the end, the Brown court awarded “reverse[d] and remande[d] for the entry of an 
award to Richards for his trial fees of $540,000.”76 
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals in Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201, ¶ 
2, 71 P.3d 188, 192, upheld an award of $432,941.36 in attorney fees. The Kraatz court 
concluded that “Kraatz’s counsel’s fee affidavit and very detailed accompanying materials 
convince us that Kraatz thoroughly accounted for all time spent pursuing his respective 
claims....”77 In addition, the Kraatz court rejected the arguments raised to reduce the fee amount, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
71 Id. at 436. 
72 Brown, 1999 UT App 109, ¶ 18, 978 P.2d at 475 (emphasis added).  
73 Id. at 475. 
74 Id. at ¶ 18, 978 P.2d at 475 (emphasis added). 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at ¶ 24, 978 P.2d at 475 (alteration in original). 
77 Kraatz, 2003 UT App 201, ¶ 58, 71 P.3d at 202. 
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viz.: “(1) Kraatz’s counsel spent time researching the trial judge’s reversal rate on appeal in 
deciding whether to appeal in this case; (2) ‘Time spent on travel is not fully compensable’; (3) 
Kraatz’s counsel billed for two or more attorneys’ time spent on the same task; and (4) Kraatz’s 
counsel billed for time spent in attorney conferences.”78 The Court simply responded that 
“Heritage has not cited any Utah authority suggesting that any one of these things should not be 
recoverable within the trial court’s discretion.”79  
The Court in Kraatz also emphasized that the fee was appropriate due to the duration, 
difficulty and complexity of the litigation, the overlapping nature of the claims, the amount in 
controversy and the financial analysis accordingly, the discovery taken, the experience and 
expertise of legal counsel, the necessity of involving multiple attorneys in the representation, and 
the overall reasonableness of the fee award.80 Applying the factors discussed in Kraatz 
establishes that Gold’s Gym’s fee calculation is reasonable.  
First, this litigation has been ongoing for over 11 years. Second, this case has proven to 
be complex due to the multiple claims asserted by Plaintiffs, the relation of the present case to 
the previously filed case, the lack of witnesses due to death or other causes, the unavailability or 
lack of participation of named parties in this action, the difficulty in proving damages in this 
case, and because of Plaintiffs’ repeated failures to abide by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
particularly with respect to discovery. Third, as addressed herein, Plaintiffs’ claims overlap 
significantly, all stemming from a common core of facts. Fourth, settlement was almost 
impossible given Plaintiffs’ outrageous settlement offers despite their speculative evidence 
supporting their claims and particularly damages. Plaintiffs’ asserted at trial that they were 
                                                   
78 Id. at ¶ 60, 71 P.3d at 202. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 202–03.  
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entitled to roughly $2,000,000 (i.e. $450,000 plus $100,000 annually from 2002 to the present),81 
and in their Complaint, they sought an additional $1,000,000 in punitive damages.82 Although 
Plaintiffs sought astronomical amounts in damages, Gold’s Gym prudently rejected Plaintiffs’ 
unreasonable settlement offers given the financial analysis and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ case.      
Fifth, difficulty that arose in this case  because Plaintiffs repeatedly attempted to re-open 
fact and expert discovery after cut-off dates, to which this Court flatly rejected on several 
occasions. Sixth, Gold’s Gym lead attorney has over 30 years of litigation and trial experience. 
This case required an experienced litigator to address the complexities and nuances raised by 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint against the several Defendants. Seventh, due to the longevity and 
complexity of this case, Gold’s Gym took advantage of involving junior associates to engage in 
researching, drafting, and analyzing this case in addition to having a more experienced attorney 
for more complex issues, strategy, and trial preparation. Finally, as in Kraatz and Brown, Gold’s 
Gym’s requested fee amount is reasonable given the duration, complexity, and overall outcome 
of this case.         
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant, Gold’s Gym International, Inc., respectfully 
requests this Court to grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees in its entirety, consisting of 
attorneys’ fees and costs as follows: (1) $13,676.42 for prevailing on Plaintiffs’ breach of 
contract claim; (2) $82,792.74 for prevailing on the discovery motions throughout the entire 
case; (3) $146,857.76 for ultimately prevailing on the summary judgment motions; (4) 
$123,993.61 for prevailing on the pre- and post-trial motions and at trial on Plaintiffs’ intentional 
                                                   
81 Trial Transcript, 3 November 2016, pp.11, 13.  
82 Complaint, p.50; see also Ex. 2, email dated 30 December 2016 from Plaintiffs’ counsel re: Proposed Default 
Judgments Against Defendants Vince Engle, Health Source, Inc., and Fitcorp, Inc. wherein Plaintiffs seek 
$7,165,032.21 in damages, $3,762,632.21 in prejudgment interest, and $20,000,000 in punitive damages to be 
entered against the other Defendants. 
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interference, conversion, and conspiracy claims, which (1) through (4), supra, totals $367,320.53 
of attorneys’ fees and costs thus far (not including the fees incurred preparing this Motion), and 
(5) the right to supplement this Motion with the additional attorneys’ fees incurred for preparing 
and arguing this Motion before this Court.  
DATED this 9th day of January, 2017.  
       OSTLER MOSS & THOMPSON 
       /s/ Blake T. Ostler   
       By:   Blake T. Ostler 
       Attorney for Defendant Gold’s Gym  
































Page 25 of 25 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that on the 9th day of January, 2017, I caused to be served by the method 
indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT GOLD’S GYM 
INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS on the 
following:  
 
       VIA EMAIL 
       VIA HAND DELIVERY 
       VIA U.S. MAIL  
 X   VIA ELECTRONIC FILING 
 
 Holly S. Chamberlain 
CHAMBERLAIN LAW, PLLC 
2235 South 2200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah  84109 
Email: chamberlainlaw@gmail.com  
 
       VIA EMAIL 
       VIA HAND DELIVERY 
       VIA U.S. MAIL  
 X   VIA ELECTRONIC FILING 
 
 Karthik Nadesan  
NADESANBECK P.C.  
8 East Broadway, Suite 625  
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111  
Email: karthik@nadesanbeck.com  
Attorneys for Plaintiffs  
 
       VIA EMAIL 
       VIA HAND DELIVERY 
       VIA U.S. MAIL  
 X   VIA ELECTRONIC FILING 
 Brian C. Harrison 
BRIAN C. HARRISON P.C. 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah  84604 
Email: attorney@brianharrisonpc.com  




      
       /s/     Kiersten Slade   


















Blake T. Ostler (Bar No. 4642)  
supes00@gmail.com  
Tyler J. Moss (Bar No. 15685) 
tylermoss22@gmail.com  
 
OSTLER MOSS & THOMPSON  
57 West 200 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
T: (801) 575-5000 
F: (801) 880-7640 
 
Attorneys for Defendant Gold’s Gym International, Inc. 
 
 
 THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
 SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
 
 
CLARK CHAMBERLAIN and BRENT 
STATHAM, 
 




VINCE ENGLE, an individual; HEALTH 
SOURCE, INC., a Utah Company; FITCORP, 
INC., a Utah Company; TRAVIS IZATT, an 
individual, d/b/a Gold’s Gym of St. George; 
FITNESS SOURCE, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; O.P.M. HOLDINGS, INC., 
a Utah Company; GOLD’S GYM 
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Texas Company; 
ST. GEORGE FITNESS, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, d/b/a Gold’s Gym - Utah 
Group; and DOES I through X, 
 
                   Defendants. 
 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT GOLD’S GYM 
INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S MOTION 
FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 
 
Civil No. 090919785 
 
Judge Todd Shaughnessy 
Defendant, Gold’s Gym International, Inc. (“Gold’s Gym”), pursuant to Rules 7, 73, and 
54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, and in support hereof, states the following:            
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I. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
A. Plaintiffs Directly Asserted Claims as a Party to the License Agreement. This 
Court has consistently ruled that Plaintiffs asserted claims that arose only because they were 
parties to the License Agreement on behalf of Health Source of St. George, LLC (“Company”). 
Plaintiffs claimed that the rights embodied in the License Agreement were converted by Gold’s 
Gym in conspiracy with Engel. The Court ruled that they had standing to maintain such claims as 
parties to the License Agreement.1 Further, in their 26 April 2013 Memorandum in Opposition to 
Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs admitted several times that they 
brought this action on behalf of the Company as a party to the License Agreement. Plaintiffs 
have sought to enforce the rights of the License Agreement for over a decade, even throughout a 
three-day bench trial before this Court. Now, however, Plaintiffs inconsistently argue that they 
are not responsible for the Company’s obligations under the License Agreement, including the 
liability for the attorneys’ fees under the explicit attorneys’ fees provision of that License 
Agreement. In other words, Plaintiffs wish to “have their cake and eat it too.”  
For example, Plaintiffs’ opposition memorandum provides that “Plaintiffs’ claims belong 
to them personally (for example, Gold’s interfered with their individual relations with the other 
members of the LLC, as alleged in the previous section, and with their individual relations with 
the Provo Group) but also belong to Health Source LLC. Under controlling law, however, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to bring the claims personally on behalf of the LLC.”2  
Plaintiffs further cited Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1701, providing that “[a] member may 
bring an action in the right of a company to recover a judgment in its favor: (1) if the managers 
                                                 
1 See 9-16-2013 Memo Decision re: Summary Judgment Motion, pp.13-14; see also 12-19-2016 Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, p.22.     
2 Plaintiffs’ 4-26-2017 Memorandum in Opposition to Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p.85 
(emphasis added). 
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or, if no managers, the members with authority to do so have refused to bring the action and the 
decision of the managers or members not to sue constitutes an abuse of discretion or involves a 
conflict of interest that prevents an unbiased exercise of judgment; (2) if an effort to cause those 
managers or members to bring the action is not likely to succeed.”3 Plaintiffs posited that “an 
effort to cause [the Company] to bring this action would certainly not have succeeded, as [the 
Company] and Engle were complicit in the actions causing damage herein. Plaintiffs therefore 
properly brought the action in the right of the company and are the proper plaintiffs under Utah 
Code Annotated Section 48-2c-1702, because they were members at the time of the transactions 
of which they complain.”4 
Plaintiffs’ also cited Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that “a 
party authorized by statute may sue in that person’s name without joining the party for whose 
benefit the action is brought.”5 Plaintiffs additionally argued that “Health Source’s absence as a 
plaintiff does not impede its ability to protect its interest because Plaintiffs have asserted Health 
Source’s claims on its behalf, and no parties are at risk of incurring multiple obligations due to 
Plaintiffs, rather than Health Source itself, asserting Health Source’s claims.”6  
Finally, Plaintiffs previously argued that Health Source should be joined in this litigation 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-801(2), which provides: “a manager-managed company 
shall become a member-managed company upon the death, withdrawal, or removal of the sole 
remaining manager, or if one of the events described in Subsection 48-2c-708(1)(d), (e), or (f) 
occurs with regard to the sole remaining manager, unless another manager is appointed by the 
                                                 
3 Id.  
4 Id. at 85-86 (emphasis added). 
5 Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
6 Id. at 87 (emphasis added). 
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members within 90 days after the occurrence of any such event.”7 “If the Court thus makes a 
determination that the LLC should now be joined as a party and that such joinder would now be 
proper, it would not be proper to dismiss the case, but rather it would be proper for the Court to 
add the LLC as a party pursuant to the aforementioned rules.”8 It follows that Plaintiffs 
asserted claims directly under the License Agreement and must bear the burden of attorneys’ fees 
because they claimed the benefits of its protections. 
B. Having Asserted a Right to Receive the Benefits, the Plaintiffs Must Also Accept 
the Burdens of the License Agreement. Under Utah law, “[a] party cannot accept the benefits 
of a contract and reject its burdens.”9 In this case, Plaintiffs cannot seek to enforce the License 
Agreement against Gold’s Gym, i.e. the benefits of a contract, and then reject the liability that 
comes thereunder, i.e. the burdens of the contract such as the duty to pay attorneys’ fees if the 
party does not prevail. From the commencement of this lawsuit, Plaintiffs have brought this 
action on behalf of and in the right of the Company in order to enforce the License Agreement 
against Gold’s Gym. However, now that each of their claims have been dismissed with 
prejudice, Plaintiffs attempt to reject the burdens of the License Agreement, namely the liability 
of attorneys’ fees incurred on behalf of the prevailing party in this action, which is Gold’s Gym. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs must accept both the benefits and burdens of the License Agreement and 
should not be allowed to circumvent their contractual obligations. 
C. Plaintiffs Are Estopped From Arguing That They Are Not Bound by the 
Attorneys Fees Provision of the License Agreement. “Generally in legal proceedings a party 
                                                 
7 Id. at 88. 
8 Id. (emphasis added). 
9 Richardson v. Rupper, 2014 UT App 11, ¶ 11, 318 P.3d 1218, 1221; see Francisconi v. Hall, 2008 UT App 166 
(“A plaintiff cannot simultaneously claim the benefits of a contract and repudiate its burdens and conditions.”) 
(citing Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Gregor, 777 So.2d 79, 82 (Ala.2000)); see also Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 372, 325 P.2d 899, 903 (1958) (finding that a party "cannot 
accept the benefits of the contract and reject the burdens."). 
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with knowledge of all the facts will not be allowed to take a position, pursue that position to 
fruition, and later, with no substantial change in circumstances, return to attack the validity of the 
prior position or the outcome flowing from it.”10 “Equitable estoppel reflects circumstances 
where it is not fair for a party to represent facts to be one way...and then change positions later to 
the other’s detriment.”11 “[E]stoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another’s disadvantage, 
a right inconsistent with a position [it has] previously taken.”12 The elements for equitable 
estoppel are: (1) an affirmative admission, statement or act inconsistent with the position 
afterwards asserted; (2) action by the other party in reliance on the admission, statement or act; 
and (3) injury to the relying party resulting from allowing the first party to make the inconsistent 
admission, statement or act.13  
Throughout the entirety of this action, Plaintiffs pressed claims of, inter alia, breach of 
the License Agreement. Plaintiffs insisted that their claims were on behalf of and in the right of 
Health Source-St. George, LLC, the Company that is a party to the License Agreement. For the 
past decade and more, Plaintiffs have used the License Agreement against Gold’s Gym as a 
sword.14 Gold’s has spent literally hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees in reliance 
on the Court’s finding that the Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims on behalf of the entity 
under the License Agreement. Now, however, they wish to use the License Agreement as a 
shield, asking this Court to find that they are not parties to that agreement and therefore its terms 
do not provide privity of contract and deny that Health Source of St. George is a party to this 
                                                 
10 Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
11 Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ¶ 15, 158 P.3d 1088, 1092. 
12 Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 2014 UT App 154, ¶ 2, 330 P.3d 762, 764 (citations omitted); see also Zeese v. Siegel’s 
Estate, 534 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah 1975) ("For a period of four years plaintiffs dealt with defendant as the lessee, they 
are estopped by this conduct to take the inconsistent position that defendant did not have a leasehold interest."). 
13 Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶ 23, 250 P.3d 56, 63. 
14 See generally Terry v. Bacon, 2011 UT App 432, ¶ 17, 269 P.3d 188, 193 (“We agree with the jurisdictions 
holding that fairness dictates that ‘[contracts may] not be used both as a sword and a shield.’”) (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted).  
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action.15 However, Plaintiffs are estopped from raising an inconsistent position from a previous 
one that they have argued for over a decade throughout this litigation.   
D. Plaintiffs Fail to Rebut That the Attorneys’ Fee Provision In the License 
Agreement Provides Fees to Gold’s Gym. In their opposition memorandum, Plaintiffs do not 
refute or even attempt to present a counterargument that the attorneys’ fee provision found in 
Section 4 of the License Agreement is broadly-worded and provides for attorneys’ fees to be 
recovered by Gold’s Gym. Therefore, the Court should make a finding that the attorneys’ fee 
provision is broadly-worded and mandatory, and enforce it accordingly.  
E. Plaintiffs Fail to Rebut That Gold’s Gym is the “Prevailing Party” In this 
Action. In their opposition memorandum, Plaintiffs do not refute or even attempt to present a 
counterargument that Gold’s Gym is the prevailing party in this matter. Therefore, the Court 
should make a finding that Gold’s Gym is the prevailing party according to the attorneys’ fee 
provision in Section 4 of the License Agreement.  
F. Plaintiffs Fail to Rebut That the Claims for Intentional Interference With 
Economic Relations, Conversion, and Conspiracy “Relate to or Arise Out of” the License 
Agreement. In their opposition memorandum, Plaintiffs do not refute or even attempt to present 
a counterargument that the claims for intentional interference, conversion, and conspiracy relate 
to or arise out of the License Agreement. Therefore, the Court should make a finding that 
Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional interference, conversion, and conspiracy relate to or arise out of 
the License Agreement. 
G. Plaintiffs Do Not Argue That Gold’s Gym’s Attorneys’ Fees Are Unreasonable. 
With respect to defending the breach of contract claim, pursuing discovery-related items 
throughout fact and expert discovery, preparing for and trying this case in a three-day bench trial, 
                                                 
15 Id. 
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and filing post-trial motions, including this Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Plaintiffs do not 
complain that Gold’s Gym’s attorneys’ fees are unreasonable. Therefore, this Court should 
award Gold’s Gym the following in attorneys’ fees: (1) $13,676.42 relating to the Motion to 
Dismiss the breach of contract claim; (2) $82,792.74 relating to discovery motions; (3) 
$123,993.61 relating to pre- and post-trial motions (excluding the expenses incurred in bringing 
this Motion for Attorneys’ Fees); and (4) the amount to be determined in bringing and arguing 
this Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, which will be provided to the Court in a respective affidavit 
upon the Court’s ruling on this Motion.  
H. Plaintiffs’ Case Law Cited In Relation to Refusing to Award Attorneys’ Fees is 
Distinguishable From the Present Matter. In Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT 
App 361, ¶ 52, 246 P.3d 131, 148–49, the court denied awarding attorneys’ fees on an 
unsuccessful summary judgment motion because the “motion did not actually lead to a 
vindication of Defendants’ rights under the Listing Agreement; nor did the trial court’s findings 
set forth any connection between the motion and Defendants’ ultimate success in the case.” In 
addition, “the trial court expressly rejected the proximate cause argument raised as a significant 
part of the motion, both in its ruling denying summary judgment and when the issue was raised 
again in Defendants’ motion for a directed verdict made after the close of evidence.”16 Thus, in 
Gilbert, the bases for the summary judgment were eventually rejected both at the motion stage 
and again at trial.17 In contrast, the arguments made in Gold’s Gym’s summary judgment motion 
were ultimately adopted by the Court after a three-day bench trial. Gilbert is, therefore, 
distinguishable.  In addition, not only did Gold’s Gym prevail on all of Plaintiffs’ claims, but the 
                                                 
16 Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361, ¶ 52, 246 P.3d 131, 148–49. 
17 Id. 
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Court adopted the arguments made by Gold’s Gym in its summary judgment motions as the 
bases for ultimately prevailing at trial.18     
Plaintiffs next rely upon ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, ¶ 32, 998 P.2d 254, 
261, which is problematic because it provides no analysis or reasoning relating to awarding 
attorneys’ fees with respect to summary judgment motions. The court in ProMax actually 
awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendants “in defending their judgment on this appeal”, but then 
– without explanation or reason – simply denied defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees relating 
to the motion to dismiss the appeal. Thus, ProMax does not address the issue before this Court 
and is distinguishable regarding summary judgment motions.   
Plaintiffs’ third cited case is Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998), 
which is irrelevant because it deals with a claim for attorneys’ fees for bad-faith litigation 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Moreover, the court in Valcarce refused to award 
attorneys’ fees because the counterclaim was unsuccessful. Accordingly, Valcarce is 
distinguishable from the present case because Gold’s Gym successfully prevailed on all of 
Plaintiffs’ claims.  
Plaintiffs’ final, unreliable cited case is Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass’n, 
657 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982), which refused to award attorneys’ fees with respect to a 
counterclaim that was unsuccessful. As in Valcarce, Paul Mueller is also distinguishable from 
the present case because Gold’s Gym successfully prevailed on all of Plaintiffs’ claims.   
In contrast to Plaintiffs’ distinguishable case law cited in its opposition memorandum, 
Deer Crest Assocs. I, L.C. v. Deer Crest Resort Grp., No. 2:04-CV-220 TS, 2007 WL 3143691, 
at *2 (D. Utah Oct. 24, 2007), is directly on point with this action. The Deer Crest court awarded 
$279,726.00 in attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party and stated as follows:  
                                                 
18 See Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, pp.16-18. 
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Plaintiff’s unsuccessful motion was related to the claims on which it eventually 
prevailed. Particularly in the context of a failed motion for summary judgment, 
in which fact development is critical, a subsequent success is possible after 
material issues of fact are resolved. Plaintiff ultimately achieved the goals of 
this lawsuit and, therefore, attorneys’ fees for the partial summary judgment 
motion are appropriately included in the total fee. (emphasis added).  
 
Therefore, Gold’s Gym is entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing the motions for 
summary judgment because Gold’s Gym ultimately prevailed upon the arguments that were the 
bases for filing such motions.  
II. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant, Gold’s Gym International, Inc., respectfully 
requests this Court to grant Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees in its entirety, consisting of 
attorneys’ fees and costs as follows: (1) $13,676.42 for prevailing on Plaintiffs’ breach of 
contract claim; (2) $82,792.74 for prevailing on the discovery motions throughout the entire 
case; (3) $146,857.76 for ultimately prevailing on the summary judgment motions; (4) 
$123,993.61 for prevailing on the pre- and post-trial motions and at trial on Plaintiffs’ intentional 
interference, conversion, and conspiracy claims, which (1) through (4), supra, totals $367,320.53 
of attorneys’ fees and costs thus far (not including the fees incurred preparing this Motion), and 
(5) the right to supplement this Motion with the additional attorneys’ fees incurred for preparing 
and arguing this Motion before this Court.  
DATED this 24th day of March, 2017.  
       OSTLER MOSS & THOMPSON 
       /s/ Blake T. Ostler   
       By:   Blake T. Ostler 
       Attorney for Defendant Gold’s Gym  
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                                    3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE  
                                   SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH  
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
 
        CLARK CHAMBERLAIN,                        :  RULING                                    
                    Plaintiff,                    :  RULING AND ORDER                          
                                                  :  
        vs.                                       :  Case No: 090919785                        
        VINCE ENGLE,                              :  Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY                 
                    Defendant.                    :  Date:    March 29, 2017                   
                                                                                               
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
 
        Before the court is defendant Golds Gym's motion for attorneys' fees. The motion is 
        fully briefed, Oral argument is unnecessary. The court denies the motion and declines 
        to award attorneys' fees for the following reasons, along with the reasons set forth in
        the opposition papers:
        
        Plaintiffs Clark Chamberlain and Brent Statham are not parties, in their individual 
        capacities, to the agreement that contains the fee provision Golds Gym seeks to 
        enforce. The licensee under that agreement is Health Source of St. George, LLC. Messrs.
        Chamberlain and Statham signed personal guarantees, but Golds Gym has not shown that it
        is entitled to an award of its fees under the terms of the guarantee.
        
        The court disagrees with Golds Gym's claim that all claims in this case arise out of or
        relate to the License Agreement. If Golds Gym was entitled to attorneys' fees, and the 
        court concludes it is not, it would only be entitled to fees incurred in connection 
        with its motion to dismiss the claim for breach of contract, which was granted in 2009 
        and appears to involve about $10-15,000 of the $370,000 sought.
        
        This is the court's order on the attorneys' fee motion and no further order is 
        necessary.                                                                             
 
        
        End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page                                  
 
        
                           CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION                                         
        I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for 
        case 090919785 by the method and on the date specified.                                
                                                   
Page 1 of 2
04340




        Case No: 090919785 Date:    Mar 29, 2017
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
 
        EMAIL:  TROY L BOOHER tbooher@zjbappeals.com                                           
        EMAIL:  HOLLY S CHAMBERLAIN chamberlainlaw@gmail.com                                   
        EMAIL:  BRIAN C HARRISON brianharrisonpc@gmail.com                                     
        EMAIL:  TYLER J MOSS tylermoss22@gmail.com                                             
        EMAIL:  KARTHIK NADESAN karthik@nadesanbeck.com                                        
        EMAIL:  JULIE J NELSON jnelson@zjbappeals.com                                          
        EMAIL:  BLAKE T OSTLER supes00@gmail.com                                               
                                                   
              03/29/2017                  /s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY                               
        Date: ____________________         ______________________________                      
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                                    3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE  
                                   SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH  
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
 
        CLARK CHAMBERLAIN,                        :  RULING                                    
                    Plaintiff,                    :  RULING AND ORDER                          
                                                  :  
        vs.                                       :  Case No: 090919785                        
        VINCE ENGLE,                              :  Judge: TODD M SHAUGHNESSY                 
                    Defendant.                    :  Date:    March 29, 2017                   
                                                                                               
        ______________________________________________________________________________________
 
        Before the court is defendant Golds Gym's motion for attorneys' fees. The motion is 
        fully briefed, Oral argument is unnecessary. The court denies the motion and declines 
        to award attorneys' fees for the following reasons, along with the reasons set forth in
        the opposition papers:
        
        Plaintiffs Clark Chamberlain and Brent Statham are not parties, in their individual 
        capacities, to the agreement that contains the fee provision Golds Gym seeks to 
        enforce. The licensee under that agreement is Health Source of St. George, LLC. Messrs.
        Chamberlain and Statham signed personal guarantees, but Golds Gym has not shown that it
        is entitled to an award of its fees under the terms of the guarantee.
        
        The court disagrees with Golds Gym's claim that all claims in this case arise out of or
        relate to the License Agreement. If Golds Gym was entitled to attorneys' fees, and the 
        court concludes it is not, it would only be entitled to fees incurred in connection 
        with its motion to dismiss the claim for breach of contract, which was granted in 2009 
        and appears to involve about $10-15,000 of the $370,000 sought.
        
        This is the court's order on the attorneys' fee motion and no further order is 
        necessary.                                                                             
 
        
        End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page                                  
 
        
                           CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION                                         
        I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for 
        case 090919785 by the method and on the date specified.                                
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: March 29, 2017 /s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY
01:39:39 PM District Court Judge
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        EMAIL:  TROY L BOOHER tbooher@zjbappeals.com                                           
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        EMAIL:  BRIAN C HARRISON brianharrisonpc@gmail.com                                     
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              03/29/2017                  /s/ TODD M SHAUGHNESSY                               
        Date: ____________________         ______________________________                      
                                                     


































Blake T. Ostler (Bar No. 4642)  
supes00@gmail.com  
Tyler J. Moss (Bar No. 15685) 
tylermoss22@gmail.com  
 
OSTLER MOSS & THOMPSON  
57 West 200 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
T: (801) 575-5000 
F: (801) 880-7640 
 
Attorneys for Defendant Gold’s Gym International, Inc. 
 
 
 THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
 SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
 
 
CLARK CHAMBERLAIN and BRENT 
STATHAM, 
 




VINCE ENGLE, an individual; HEALTH 
SOURCE, INC., a Utah corporation; 
FITCORP, INC., a Utah corporation; TRAVIS 
IZATT, an individual, d/b/a Gold’s Gym of St. 
George; FITNESS SOURCE, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; O.P.M. 
HOLDINGS, INC., a Utah corporation; 
GOLD’S GYM INTERNATIONAL, INC., a 
Texas corporation; ST. GEORGE FITNESS, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, d/b/a 
Gold’s Gym - Utah Group; and DOES I 
through X, 
 
                   Defendants. 
 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
 
Civil No. 090919785 
 
Judge Todd Shaughnessy 
 
The Defendant, Gold’s Gym International, Inc. (“Gold’s Gym”), pursuant to Rule 4(d) of 
the Utah Appellate Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby submit this Notice of Cross-Appeal from the 
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Judgment entered on 29 March 2017 by the Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy of the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah denying attorneys’ fees to Gold’s Gym.  
DATED this 4th day of April, 2017.  
       OSTLER MOSS & THOMPSON 
       /s/ Blake T. Ostler   
       By:   Blake T. Ostler 
       Attorney for Defendant Gold’s Gym  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that on the 4th day of April, 2017, I caused to be served by the method 
indicated below a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL on the 
following: 
 
       VIA EMAIL 
       VIA HAND DELIVERY 
       VIA U.S. MAIL  
 X   VIA ELECTRONIC FILING 
 
 Holly S. Chamberlain 
CHAMBERLAIN LAW, PLLC 
2235 South 2200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah  84109 
Email: chamberlainlaw@gmail.com  
 
       VIA EMAIL 
       VIA HAND DELIVERY 
       VIA U.S. MAIL  
 X   VIA ELECTRONIC FILING 
 
 
 Karthik Nadesan  
NADESANBECK P.C.  
8 East Broadway, Suite 625  
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111  
Email: karthik@nadesanbeck.com  
 
       VIA EMAIL 
       VIA HAND DELIVERY 
       VIA U.S. MAIL  
 X   VIA ELECTRONIC FILING 
 Troy L. Booher  
Julie J. Nelson  
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER   
341 South Main Street, Fourth Floor  
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111  
Email: tbooher@zjbappeals.com   
Email: jnelson@zjbappeals.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs  
 
       VIA EMAIL 
       VIA HAND DELIVERY 
       VIA U.S. MAIL  
 X   VIA ELECTRONIC FILING 
 
 
 Brian C. Harrison 
BRIAN C. HARRISON P.C. 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah  84604 
Email: attorney@brianharrisonpc.com  
Attorney for Defendant St. George Fitness, 
LLC 
 
      
       /s/     Kiersten Slade   
        Legal Assistant to Blake T. Ostler 
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